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ABSTRACT:  
Subjects generate income by investing in productive activities or appropriation.  Conflict 
is always pareto-inferior to peace.  Malevolent preferences, disharmonious consumption, 
asymmetric information, and weak institutions lead the parties into a conflict trap.   
This study finds that third-party economic intervention in conflicts can overcome the 
constraints of scarce resources, reverse the incentives for fighting, and shift the decision 
making process towards higher social welfare levels which lay beyond violent outcomes 
of the bargaining process.  Intervening parties have to complement the current toolset of 
coercive and noncoercive measures with economic development and state building. 
The models of conflict suggest that for some players, appropriation yields more profit 
than regular production.  Without guaranteed independent authorities the players are 
better off defending themselves.  Given expectations about the future, players may decide 
for war even when peace yields higher immediate benefits.  Players will not disarm 
unless they can be sure that their security needs will be satisfied in the future.  Even 
without a common government and disarmament, opposing parties can reach a peaceful 
equilibrium:  At some point the costs of war outweigh the payoff.  If the payoff of a civil 
war, e.g. rights, is a public good, individuals have no incentive to join the fight unless 
they are offered immediate personal advantages.  Investments in a civil war economy 
have to be targeted.  Increasing the productivity of land in a territory-based conflict is 
deconstructive.  Conflicts are continuous games in which outcomes alternate between war 
and peace.  Peace settlements are not final and will need renegotiations. 
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The idea of appropriating as a form of income that competes with regular productive 
efforts was introduced by Pareto (1909, p. 466) and picked-up by Haavelmo (1954, p. 92) 
as well as Hirshleifer (1985).  Only until then researchers devoted increased attention to 
the economic incentives of conflict.  This was a necessary step toward a more realistic 
understanding of violent conflict.  The literature refers to violent conflict as inter- and 
intra-state conflicts, civil wars, revolutions, etc.  Tullock (1971, p. 89) argues that the 
previous understanding of revolutions was overly romanticized:  Civil wars are not driven 
only by altruistic motives, but also by various opportunities for personal gains.  This has 
significant implications on understanding the motives of conflict, their settlement, and 
interventions.  Aware that conflict is driven by many factors, this study focusses on the 
economic motives of conflict.  Other motives will be mentioned briefly when the models 
below account for such.  
No player will miss a chance to profit from others.  Based on this conclusion from the 
works of Niccolo Machiavelli, Hirshleifer (1994, p. 3) introduces the Machiavelli 
Theorem.  It complements Coase’s Theorem (Coase, 1960) which says that no player will 




will only cooperate when the payoff is higher than from fighting.  On the other hand, 
players will not desert from agreements as long as they cannot realize higher payoffs on 
their own. 
Since the end of the Cold War, civil wars have made up the main part of violent conflicts.  
This is not to say that the Cold War caused these civil wars.  Fearon (1995) finds in an 
empirical study that the majority of civil wars which were observed after the end of the 
Cold War started after World War II.  Therefore, it is essential to obtain a better 
understanding of the nature and motives of conflicts.  Economic modeling is an important 
tool to create such awareness. 
The Importance of Conflict Economics in the Research on Civil Wars 
Conflict economics utilizes methods and tools of economic analysis to research conflicts 
and related issues.  The study of conflict economics intersects with a variety of economic 
fields such as development economics, public finance, microeconomics and 
macroeconomics, international trade, and behavioral economics.  Applying economic 
theory to conflicts is useful because conflicts evolve around problems which play 
important roles in economic studies:  competition over resources and property rights, 
public goods, negative external effects, taxation and redistribution, economic decision 
making of individuals and firms, and first-mover advantages and dominance.  Conflict 
economics is strongly oriented towards policy recommendations.  Economists strive to 
find the most effective and efficient tools to solve a problem.  Different phases of a 
problem may call for different instruments.  However, the implementation of these 




find tools for its resolution and prevention.  Therefore, the study of conflicts is also 
referred to as peace studies.  
Microeconomics has two branches: exchange theory and conflict theory (Hirshleifer, 
1995b, p. 188).  Exchange theory is based on the assumption of Coase’s Theorem.  
Economic subjects will cooperate if it is mutually beneficial (Coase, 1960).  Conflict 
theory deals with one-sided advantage through conflict and is best summarized by 
Machiavelli’s Theorem: Individuals will use the opportunity to profit from others 
(Hirshleifer, 1994).  
As there is no universal model to explain the theory of exchange, there is no universal 
method to model conflict.  Perfect competition and monopoly and their various mixtures 
require different modeling approaches.  Conflict theory is not an exception (Hirshleifer, 
1995b, p. 179). 
Economists are not interested in the design or proper employment of economic incentive 
schemes to steer conflict towards peace.  This is better left to diplomats, politicians, 
development organizations which can rely on individuals who have the insights of the 
conflict, area, players, relationships, and networks.  Economists are interested in 
economies of scale and scope, complements and substitutes in production, and the 
motivating factors that make individuals behave as they do.  When economists study the 
technology of conflict, they are interested in macroeconomic factors and global payoff 
schemes for the conflicts at hand.  Therefore, when modeling conflict, Hirshleifer (1995b, 




The importance of conflict economics has grown significantly and studies of conflict fall 
into two regional categories:  interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts.  Due to the 
World Wars and the following Cold War, it is reasonable to say that relationships 
between states were more important until the end of the twentieth century.  
Interdependency was believed to have positive external effects on conflicts.  Since the 
end of the Cold War, the spotlight has shifted toward the study of intrastate conflicts:  
insurrections, revolutions, uprisings, civil wars, civil conflicts.  The ongoing insurrections 
in the Arab World reinforce the timeliness and relevance of conflict economics and 
demand an even stronger focus on intrastate conflicts.  The study of conflict economics is 
critical for an extensive audience including incumbents, insurgents, mediating third 
parties, neighboring countries, international organizations, and international trade. 
Research Question 
The present work intends to study whether third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts 
can help to overcome the constraint of scarce resources, influence/reverse the incentives 
for fighting, and shift the decision making process towards higher social welfare levels 
that lay beyond violent outcomes of the bargaining model. 
Rationale for the Study 
Incentive-based, soft intervention needs further attention.  The current literature on soft 
intervention usually deals with purchases (see e.g. Rothchild and Emmanuel (2010)).  
However, if economic factors are responsible for pushing an entire population into civil 




This work aspires to help filling the research gap.  It shall fit into the research on the 
motivations of civil war (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) or Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004)), on identity-based conflicts (see e.g. Rothchild (1997, pp. 1-22)), violence (see 
e.g. Kalyvas (2006, pp. 146-209)), and coercive as well as non-coercive interventions 
(see e.g. Rothchild (1997, pp. 243-280) and Rothchild and Emmanuel (2010)). 
The results of this study will be useful to researchers as well as mediators and 
peacekeepers in civil wars.  Understanding the dynamics of bargaining during civil wars 
will allow developing strategies of intervention which can shift the outcome of the 
bargaining process toward a non-violent solution.  The hypothesis is that economic 
incentives create a bargaining atmosphere, increase the number of potential settlements, 
and yield options which favor non-violent sustainable solutions.  If the frameworks 
studied in this work find such conclusions, intervening third parties will have to 
complement military and diplomatic interventions with economic incentives. 
Due to the ongoing Arab Revolt
1
 and whenever the models allow, the discussion will 
focus on the bargaining between two groups of which one is the government and the 
other one is constituted by the dominated population outside the governing elite and its 
protégées. 
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 The media generally refers to this chain of events as Arab Spring, however, the insurgents prefer the 
wording of Arab Revolt. (Personal communication with Rami Khouri, speaker for Oklahoma State 




Outline of the Study 
The study outlays the fundamental concepts of bargaining in intrastate conflicts and 
discusses findings which are important to the problem at hand.  It is presented in five 
chapters.  Chapter one introduces the reader to the research question and situates the 
problem within the context of research on peace settlements of civil wars.  Moreover, the 
first chapter explains the importance of the field of conflict economics to research on 
civil wars.   
Chapter two provides definitions and a review of the literature that relate to the research 
question.  Essentially, the review includes works on the motives of civil war, methods of 
intervention, and the sustainability and duration of peace settlements.  In addition, this 
part briefly reviews research on civil wars with regard to international trade. 
Chapter three presents economic models of conflict that contributed to understanding the 
motivations of civil war and its bargaining process.  In order to facilitate the 
understanding of  the models and their assumptions, chapter two starts off by explaining 
common game theoretical choices of modeling conflict.  The models show what 
economic incentives influence the decisions of individuals and groups to start or join a 
civil war.  Furthermore, the models show what role economic incentives and expectations 
play in ending or preventing civil war.  The pioneering works by Haavelmo (1954) and 
Hirshleifer (1985) are presented first and followed by works which further developed the 
models of conflicts.  
Chapter 4 presents the findings and conclusions from the previous chapters.  The review 




pressures cannot find other reliefs.  A Pressure and Release Model for Civil Wars 
illustrates the relations between studies on the correlates of civil war.  Identifying root 
causes helps to draw conclusions about the optimal instruments of intervention.  The 
economic models of conflict presented in the Methodology suggest that individuals as 
well as groups are drawn by economic incentives into conflict.  If conflict is an 
alternative to regular productive activity and serves as a way to generate income, 
intervention and peace settlements have to offer equal or better payoffs.  The findings are 
discussed separately and summarized in lemmas.  When appropriate, examples and 
suggestions are provided to the reader. 
Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes the results of this study.  Economic incentives have 
positive effects on peace negotiations and the durations of peace settlements.  Future 
research has to identify the best timing of the different incentive schemes and study their 
effects on the duration of peace empirically.  The chapter ends with several suggestions 






REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This chapter defines important terms for this study and reviews the literature on the 
correlates of war and peace as well as third-party intervention.  In addition, it reviews the 
Pressure and Release model from the literature on social vulnerability to natural disasters.  
This model is picked up and modified in following sections. 
The structure of the section on the correlates of war illustrates the main branches within 
the literature.  However, some of its critics are mentioned as well. 
Definitions 
Defining major terms which are used throughout this work shall facilitate the 
understanding on the models and allow for a consistent way of interpretation.  The 
definitions are based on the prevailing literature on conflict. 
Conflict 
A conflict arises when two individuals or groups perform actions which are mutually 
inconsistent.  Either they both want to have access to a rivalrous good or service or their 




compatible set of actions.  Conflicts can involve more than two parties (Nicholson, 1992, 
p. 11). 
For economists, competition is when two or more subjects in the economy contest over 
resources.  Trade is a result from contesting over resources and yields win-win situations 
for all trade partners.  Competition changes to conflict when subjects decide to engage in 
unproductive efforts, e.g. hampering or sabotaging others, in order to achieve one-sided 
advantages.  As a result, conflict theory is different from exchange theory.  The analysis 
of conflict needs to incorporate both branches (Hirshleifer, 1995b, p. 167). 
Whereas conflict can have various non-violent
2
 and violent forms, this study and the 
models below only deal with violent conflict, or war.  Some models simply study war, 
others specify whether they study inter or intra-state conflicts, civil wars, or revolutions.  
In the context of this article, conflict shall be understood as violent conflict between two 
or more groups within one state.  This definition encompasses intrastate as well as 
internationalized intrastate wars.  Hence, it is close to the term of deadly quarrels 
introduced by Richardson (1960).  However, Richardson’s definition also includes 
regular state-versus-state wars, wars between criminal organizations, and ‘simple’ 
murder. 
Intrastate conflict can take various forms, such as civil wars, revolutions, or genocides.  
For example, different parts of the population can fight against each other, or the 
population as a whole can raise against the governing elite.  Accordingly, some of the 
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 See e.g. Gould (1973) and Priest and Klein (1984) on legal conflicts, and Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) 




research and models presented below distinguish between the forms of violent intrastate 
conflict.  This study is interested in the economic motivation of violent intrastate conflict 
and ways to influence such incentives.  A detailed discussion of the scope and dynamics 
of conflicting groups is beyond the range of this work.  Therefore, the study does not 
differentiate between the forms of violent intrastate conflict.   
For reasons of simplicity, civil war is occasionally used interchangeably for violent 
intrastate conflict.  Definitions of civil war vary due to different minimum requirements 
of violence, starting and ending dates, and geographic boundaries.  It can be difficult to 
differentiate between interstate and internationalized intrastate wars (Sambanis, 2004, p. 
815).  Sambanis (2004, pp. 816-817) questions the definition of civil war by Small and 
Singer (1982) as organized intrastate violence that involves the government and requires 
more than 1,000 battle deaths.  Such definitions do not account for different degrees of 
organization, civil wars without effective governments, or imprecise reporting of 
casualties.  For the purpose of this study, a general definition of civil war as organized, 
intrastate violence is sufficient.  A minimum of battle deaths is not required. 
Violence is the application of force upon someone else’s person or property.  Coercion is 
threatening others to make them do or stop doing something (Tullock, 1980, pp. 7-8). 
In Nicholson’s definition of conflict, conflict resolution is not necessarily equal to 
eliminating conflicting interests.  A solution is a compatible set of actions that works for 
all parties and renders conflict unnecessary.  Each party should accept the settlement 
either because of rationality and self-interest, or out of fear from uncertainty about the 




the point of departure.  Otherwise, conflict is favorable to at least one party (Nicholson, 
1992). 
Third party intervention is necessary if the conflicting parties are not capable of ending 
the conflict or if the intervening third party wishes to prevent the suffering that goes 
along with a military victory by either side. 
Distribution and Redistribution 
Conflict, or engaging in unproductive actions, is the devotion of resources of opponents 
with conflicting interests to counteract each other’s attempts to reach their ambitions.  
Conflict arises during redistribution and when distribution problems occur (Tullock, 
1980, pp. 5-6). 
Investments in producing goods and services yield benefits and subjects in the economy 
will bargain over the distribution of these benefits.  In addition, the subjects are 
influenced by their opportunities to gain some of the others’ initial resource endowments.  
This will be referred to as redistribution (Tullock, 1980, pp. 2-3).  Bargaining involves 
cooperative games to reach pareto superior situations, and non-cooperative games that 
entail one-sided advantages (Tullock, 1980, p. 6). 
Social Welfare 
Social welfare, or social income, is the aggregated amount of resources, income, or utility 
of all parties in the studied economy.  In a two-player society, social income would be the 




Conflict involves transaction costs.  In order for players to achieve their goals in the 
bargaining process, they have to invest resources which then cannot be invested in 
productive efforts.  Compared to perfect competition, conflict reduces the social income 
(Tullock, 1980, p. 6). 
Rationality 
Even though, conflict reduces social welfare, bargaining may be a rational choice for the 
individual parties.  Appropriating a given amount of goods may cost less than producing 
the same bundle of goods.  In this case, appropriating is rational.  The term rational is 
used without any judgment on whether the action is morally correct or unethical (Tullock, 
1980, pp. 3-4). 
The Correlates of Peace and Conflict 
Following the concern of Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012), this study uses the term 
correlates rather than causes of peace and conflict in order to acknowledge that the 
causes of peace and conflict and their importance may vary from case to case.  In 
addition, conflict and peace involve uncertainty, incomplete information, destruction, and 
external effects.  Hence, one cannot be sure about what causes war and what is merely a 
symptom of underlying root causes. 
Poverty, hunger, and disease, for example, are not necessarily the causes of civil war.  
Coghlan et al. (2006) suggest that millions died in the Democratic Republic of Congo due 
to hunger and disease as a result of the civil war.  The destruction of war could also 




The following section provides an overview about the literature on the correlates of peace 
and conflict.  The author agrees with Lake and Rothchild (1996) in that violent conflict 
cannot only be caused by the competition over resources or old hatreds.  Violence is 
expensive, it destroys human as well as physical capital, creates suffering, and has short 
as well as long term consequences.  Taydas, Enia, and James (2011) even argue that 
distinguishing the correlates of war into greed and grievances limits our understanding of 
the occurrence of civil wars. 
Grievance 
The Grievance branch in the literature on the correlates of peace and war argues that if 
the situation is bad enough, the population or parts of it will revolt against the system or 
group that, in their view, causes or neglects their situation (Singh, 2007, p. 401).  
Common themes are that natural resources encourage separatism, old hatreds create 
vicious circles of violence, and inequalities in income lead to class wars. 
Gurr (1970) laid the foundation for the grievance literature with his relative deprivation 
theory.  Relative deprivation is the difference between what an individual thinks it 
deserves and what it can get.  This frustration builds up anger which eventually results in 
violence. 
Poverty is generally considered to be a major correlate of war.  For the poor, conflict has 
high potential and low opportunity costs.  Therefore, poor countries are likely to 
experience more conflicts (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).  In their 




factors have few explanatory power, whereas economic factors can explain considerable 
parts of the appearance of civil wars.   
Low economic performance increases the chance of conflict.  Mehlum, Moene, and 
Torvik (2005) construct a model that suggests that poverty reinforces conflict and 
economic growth strengthens peace.  Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) study the 
relationship between economic growth and the risk of conflict in 41 African countries 
during 1981–99.  They find that the risk of conflict increases by 50% for every 5% 
decline of economy performance. 
Unequal distribution of resources and the lack of redistribution of thereof lead to growing 
wealth gaps between better and lesser endowed groups.  Without instruments to acquire 
capital, individuals or groups with few resources face self-reinforcing inequality 
(Bénabou, 2000).  Banerjee and Duflo (2003) suggest that the effect of inequality on 
economic growth is ambiguous.  Economic growth is an inverted U-shaped function of 
inequality.  Therefore, economic growth can decrease with increases as well as decreases 
in inequality.  Both papers derive their results from cross-country analysis.   
Greed and Opportunity 
The branch of Greed and Opportunity within the literature on conflict sees conflict as a 
business opportunity.  Opportunity for violence refers to low costs of conflict and the 
prospect of material gain.  This research relates to the Machiavelli Theorem (Hirshleifer, 
1994, p. 3).  Individuals will engage in conflict if they can achieve a net gain (Muller & 




The idea of conflict as a form of income that competes with regular productivity was 
introduced by Pareto (1909, p. 466) and picked-up by Haavelmo (1954, p. 92).  Anderton 
and Carter (2009, chap. 2) provide a good review of the framework and corresponding 
literature. 
Low opportunity costs of war increase the risk of violent conflict to resolve grievances.  
In addition, the literature on violent conflict introduced another set of motivations.  
Rebellion-as-investment yields gains after the fight.  Grossman (1991) models insurgence 
and its deterrence as functions of tax rates and income distribution.  Groups use rebellion 
as an economic activity to compete for scarce resources.  Rebellion-as-business yields 
profits during the fight.  Violent conflict may be motivated by the opportunity of looting 
or illicit activities (Collier, 2000).  Both forms of rebellion are motivated by greed and 
facilitated by profitable opportunities. 
Looting is a form of income in civil wars.  Azam (2002) constructs a model which 
suggests that looting is more severe in societies without credit markets.  Conflicting 
parties have to loot in order to finance war efforts.  Azam and Hoeffler (2002) draw 
similar conclusions and extend their analysis to find that looting as a form of violence can 
also substitute for regular war efforts.  
Per capita income, natural resource endowments, and the size of the population influence 
the risk and duration of civil wars.  High per capita income raises the opportunity costs of 
war.  Natural resources have two effects.  They provide income which increases the 
attractiveness of war.  On the other hand, natural resources provide a tax base for the 




lower the risk of conflict.  Therefore, the correlation of natural resources and civil war is 
non-monotonic (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998).
3
 
Identity and Polarized Societies 
Identity-based conflicts add another dimension to conflict.  Whereas recent literature 
shows that fractualization, e.g. ethnic or religious division, is unlikely to cause civil wars, 
it is likely to influence the intensity of violence and the conflict’s likeliness to be settled 
peacefully. 
An identity is formed by an individual’s religious, historic, and social background 
(Horowitz, 1985, pp. 52-53).  This also includes race, language, and regional belonging 
(Gilley, 2004, p. 1158)
4
.  According to A. D. Smith (2010, p. 13) an ethnie is a shared 
identity with, e.g. common myths, traditions, and values.  Therefore, an ethnic group is a 
community that creates a sense of belonging together based on the assumption of 
common kinship (Byman, 2002, p. 5).  The members of an ethnic group generally fight 
for equal representation and rights within a nation.  An ethnic group does not have 
defined geographical or political boundaries of membership.  Hence, ethnicity is different 
from national identity and nationalism (Jesse & Williams, 2010, p. 5).  Barrington (1997, 
pp. 713-713) argues that a nation is characterized by inclusivity and the determination to 
control the territory that the members claim to own. 
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 Also see Buhaug and Rød (2006) as well as Fearon and Laitin (2003) on geographic factors and large 
populations, and Englebert and Ron (2004) as well as Thies (2010) on natural resources.  
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Ethnic identity is a subcategory in a larger set of identities.  Nationality can be one of the 
necessary attributes to determine one’s ethnic identity (Chandra, 2006, p. 400).  Chandra 
(2006, p. 399) argues that visible attributes such as race are not sufficient to define 
ethnicity.  Chandra (2006, p. 414) further increases our understanding of ethnic identity 
by assigning the attributes of stickiness and visibility to identity-building factors.  This 
helps greatly in explaining why ethnicity is exclusive and cannot be changed. 
Brubaker and Laitin (1998, p. 428) and Byman (2002, p. 6) define ethnic violence as 
violent acts between ethnicities.  Furthermore, at least one belligerent must not be a state 
or its representative, and ethnic differences have to be vital instead of secondary to the 
violence.  Ethnic conflict is a special type of intrastate violent conflict. 
All parties to a conflict will interpret history on their own which results in different 
perceptions of historic events.  Mistrust and competition build up a security dilemma.  
Neither party can afford to disarm or stop conquering.  Identity-based conflicts require all 
stakeholders to discuss their perceptions of history and build up trust before a conflict can 
be settled (Posen, 1993). 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that ethnic divisions do not cause civil wars.  
Fractualization does not show a positive relationship with the outbreak of civil war.  
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) derive a more nuanced conclusion from their study:  The 
correlation between fractualization and civil war is non-monotonic.  Highly fractionalized 
and homogenous societies both face reduced risks of civil war.  Low fractionalization 
bears higher risk of civil war.  Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) and Elbadawi and 




than homogenous societies.  The effect is strongest for polarized societies, i.e. when the 
society is divided into two groups of similar size.
5
 
If polarization correlates with the outbreak of conflict which brings destruction, it is 
logical to study the correlation of polarization and economic growth.  Benhabib and 
Rustichini (1996) construct a growth model with two groups.  The government favors one 
group over the other.  The model suggests that economic growth is relatively slower if 
one group is treated unequally.  Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) suggest that ethnic 
division leads to lower supplies of public goods.  The players cannot agree on policies 
and fear one-sided advantages.  Fafchamps (2000) studies the access of African 
manufacturers to supplier and bank credit.  Business interactions seem to overcome 
divisions.  Ethnicity or gender do not play a significant role to the access to bank credit.  
Supplier credit, however, is harder to achieve.  This suggests that parties in divided 
societies refrain from giving each other credit.  Trading and networking can overcome 
these restraints.  
Property Rights 
The absence of property rights or the lack of their enforcement determines (a) the 
allocation between productive and unproductive efforts, and (b) economic growth 
(Gonzales, 2012).  The Coase Theorem states subjects never pass up a chance to engage 
in mutually beneficial trade.  However, a key assumption of the Coase Theorem is well-
defined property rights (Coase, 1960). 
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Without proper enforcement of property rights, opposing parties engage in conflict and 
appropriate from each other.  Proper enforcement, by e.g. a government, reduces conflict 
and brings social income close to its maximum.  However, if property rights are not 
enforced independently, one player could seek one-sided advantages and become a 
hegemon (Tullock, 1974). 
Without property rights, individuals prefer immediate over long-term advantages.  They 
do not commit to sustainable usage of resources unless they can be assured that others 
will do so as well.  Hence, sustainable usage can only occur if property rights are defined 
and enforced (Deacon, 1996). 
Rational and Irrational Warfare 
The literature on greed and opportunity as correlates of war suggests that war maximizes 
profits or income for some individuals and groups.  For them, war is a business 
opportunity.   
Rational conflicting parties should realize that peaceful settlements are superior to war.  
Long-term effects of war, destruction, and social welfare impacts of conflict decrease the 
contested pie.  Aware of the considerable amount of past and ongoing civil wars, there 
have to be factors that lead decision makers to irrational choices.   
Decision makers in conflict decide for war over peace either because they are guided by 
emotions, fail to internalize the costs of war, or prefer war (Fearon, 1995).  Chapter 3 will 
introduce the concepts of preferences, opportunities, and perceptions in order to account 
for players that fail to see all costs of war or simply prefer war.  It will be shown that 




players may be unable to internalize the opportunity costs of war because of the nature of 
the distribution of information.  Here, it is essential to acknowledge that emotions lead to 
irrational activities that undermine the rational choices presented in the models below. 
Emotions can include fear, hatred, rage, and resentment (Petersen, 2002).  Hatred can be 
derived from economic competition, different traditions and states of development, and 
fear of extinction (Horowitz, 1985).  Hirshleifer (1985) uses the term ‘hostile 
preferences’.  Misperceptions about one’s own or the adversary’s strength or motives can 
lead to conflict.  In addition, misperceptions can also involve exaggerated expectations 
about the post-conflict income distribution.  Hirshleifer terms this as rebellion-by-mistake 
(1985, pp. 63-64). 
Political entrepreneurs can use emotions to rally groups and fuel conflicts.  Glaeser 
(2005) constructs an economic model that suggests that political entrepreneurs can fuel 
hatred by repeating stories.  Hatred is not formed by truth but by repetition of such 
stories.  Economic subjects have no incentive to seek the truth, unless interactions with 
the “enemy”, e.g. trade, yield benefits.   
Lake and Rothchild (1996, p. 41) discuss hatred and its relation with ethnic conflict.  
They argue that conflict rises in the presence of fear of the future and not because of old 
hatreds.  Fear is created by failing states, information failures, security dilemmas, and 
problems of credible commitments.  Nevertheless, they acknowledge that history may 
exacerbate fear. 
Revenge often is perceived as a main cause to continuing conflict and to undermining 




research suggests that taking revenge stimulates the brain and yields satisfaction (see e.g. 
de Quervain et al. (2004) and Knutson (2004)). 
In a continuous game, anticipation of retaliation creates a self-deterrence effect.  Runkel 
and Amegashie (2012) construct a model which suggests that revenge does not have to 
destabilize conflict.  Revenge is understood as an utility-enhancing action which is 
positively related to past destruction.  In other words, the higher the destruction in the 
past, the more satisfaction the revenge-seeking party will experience.  However, this set 
up implies reciprocity:  The other party will seek revenge itself.  Revenge in this model 
bears a self-deterrence effect which could outweigh the benefits of revenge. 
Trade 
As stated above, trade can help to overcome problems of divided societies and reduce the 
risk of conflict.  Polachek (1980) finds in a cross-country study that interdependence 
through trade lowers conflict significantly. 
Accordingly, when Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996b) model conflict with the prospect 
of trade, the authors originally expected the potential for trade to reduce the incentives for 
warfare.  However, the model suggests that in a setting with more than two countries, the 
prospect of trade increases arming.  Expectations of trade increase the payoff of 
conquering other territories by so much that they outweigh the losses of decreased trade.  
In addition, the authors find if trade is expected, arming is so high that at least one 
country could favor conflict without trade.  
Besley and Persson (2008) find that world market prices influence the risk of civil wars.  




Higher export prices yield higher tax or customs benefits for the controlling authority.  
Armed groups may have more incentives to seize control of the authorities. 
Third Party Intervention in Civil Wars 
Third party interventions and their effect on the risk, intensity, and duration of civil war 
has been studied by various scholars.  Rosenau (1968) and Rosenau (1969) laid the 
groundwork for research on interventions.  Rosenau established two criteria to 
characterize interventions and distinguish them from regular interstate interactions:  
Interventions are authority-targeted and convention-breaking policies.  The first requires 
interventions to target the local authority structures.  The second requires policies to 
differ from everyday interactions.  Increasing reoccurring foreign aid flows does not 
qualify, whereas cutting it off does. 
Future research on intervention developed towards two main branches.  The first dealt 
with the outcome of interventions.  The second studied who, when, and how actors 
decide to intervene. 
Kaufmann (1996) and Kaufmann (1998) state that conflicts are ended best by separating 
the conflicting parties into different nations.  Given the continuing violence in former 
Yugoslavia, Kaufmann doubted the efficiency of third party interventions.  In an 
empirical study, however, Sambanis (2000) finds that partition does not reduce the 
likelihood of reoccurring violence.  Resolving conflicts by redefining borders is not a 




Regan (1996) finds that interventions are more likely to stop violence if they incorporate 
a mix of military and economic instruments.  However, conflicts with intervention last 
longer.  Regan (2002), Enterline, Balch-Lindsay, and Joyce (2008), Elbadawi and 
Sambanis (2000), Byman and Seybolt (2003), and Gent (2008) agree that diplomatic or 
military interventions generally stretch civil wars.  Furthermore, Licklider (1995) 
concludes that negotiated settlements are very likely to break up and ultimately just delay 
a final settlement by military victory.  Hence, there is some evidence that interventions 
often fail their endeavors.  However, further research by Dixon (1996), Regan and Stam 
(2000), Greig (2001), Regan and Aydin (2006), and Regan, Frank, and Aydin (2009) 
suggests that targeted mediation can have a significant impact on the likelihood of 
peaceful and sustainable settlements.  Specifically, these authors recognized that 
mediation has to be timed and adjusted to each individual case in order to be effective.  
Murdie and Davis (2010) show that interventions sometimes even undermine human 
rights in the target country.  Lockyer (2011) argues that biased intervention can change 
the form of warfare between the belligerents. 
Regan (1998), Findley and Teo (2006), and Regan (2010) discuss the general motivation 
of intervening and its chances of success.  Regan (1998) constructs a model that suggests 
that international public attention is one of the major factors to trigger intervention.  
Especially humanitarian interventions are very likely.  On the other hand, intense violent 
conflict and shared borders decrease the chance for outside intervention.  A review of the 
literature on intervention by Regan (2010) confirms the previous results:  
Intergovernmental organizations are likely to intervene in conflicts that draw a lot of 




Sahnoun (2002) argue that the international community has a responsibility to intervene 
in order to prevent massive loss of life. 
The Instruments of Intervention 
Generally, intervening parties can choose from two different sets of intervention methods 
to complement their mediation: coercive and noncoercive.  Both methods aim at raising 
the opportunity costs of war.  Noncoercive incentives entail rewards for altering the 
preferences and cooperation: purchases, insurance, and legitimation.  They aim for 
conflict resolution.  Coercive incentives are threats and punishments that may put an end 
to conflict but they do not resolve it.  Coercive incentives are sanctions, pressures, and 
force.  Hence, coercive incentives are tools of conflict management rather than conflict 
resolution.  For coercive incentives to work the intervening parties need high degrees of 
credibility (Rothchild, 1997, pp. 97-107).  Kydd (2003) discusses the credibility problem 
of threats and promises.   
Noncoercive Incentives 
Noncoercive incentives entail rewards for altering the preferences and cooperation.  
Purchases are very easy to offer and relatively cheap.  They aim at shifting the relative 
gains so that the targeted groups or individuals choose different strategies (Rothchild, 
1997, p. 99).  Charles Taylor, for example, received rewards for leaving Liberia and 
going into exile in Nigeria.  
Insurances are promises by the intervening party to protect the interests of the opposing 




easier for them to agree on a peace agreement.  In order to do so, the insuring party has to 
show that it understands the concerns of every party and is willing to invest in their 
protection.  Offering purchases and insurance in the form of amnesty to Charles Taylor 
has illustrated the shortcoming of these policies (Rothchild & Emmanuel, 2010, p. 129).  
The recipients may find ways to profit from the noncoercive intervention but also to 
bypass it and continue their negative influence on violence.  Charles Taylor managed to 
stir up conflict from his exile.  Furthermore, the intervening party may lose the approval 
of its constituency (Rothchild & Emmanuel, 2010, p. 130). 
Legitimation of a target group can help to give this group access to international 
resources.  Similarly, losing legitimacy can reduce the available resources for conflict as 
well as lowering its prospective gains.  It might even lower morale and reduce support 
within the groups for their elites.  Legitimation has to be bound to political conditions and 
standards.  Otherwise, it might provide false incentives for behavior that is not supported 
by the intervening country (Rothchild & Emmanuel, 2010, p. 130). 
Economic support is a new form of non-coercive incentives.  As demonstrated by the 
review of the literature on Grievances, a growing body of literature links poverty and 
disparities in income distribution to a risk of civil war.  Therefore, this incentive is 
designed to address inequalities.  This incentive is different from the monetary rewards 






Coercive incentives are threats and punishments that may put an end to conflict but they 
do not resolve it.  Coercive incentives manage rather than resolve conflict.  For coercive 
incentives to work the intervening parties need high degrees of credibility (Rothchild, 
1997, p. 103). 
Pressures try to force a party to change or compromise on its position through media 
appeals, warnings, threats, or the break off of diplomatic relations.  When the 
negotiations between the Ugandan belligerents in Nairobi in 1985 did not achieve any 
results for several months, warnings were used to get the peace settlement back on track.  
The Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi proposed an ultimatum to sign the accord before 
the parties would have to pack and return to fighting (Rothchild, 1997, p. 103). 
Sanctions are economic pressures to cripple the targeted group’s resources and to make 
conflict more difficult.  It is a very tangible instrument to show disapproval of a group’s 
actions.  However, the imposing party needs influence and resources in order to fully 
implement sanctions (Rothchild, 1997, pp. 104-105).  Sanctions on the supply of 
weapons to Somalia illustrate how difficult the maintenance of sanctions is. 
Force is the usage or refusal of military power to stop violence and penalize 
noncompliance to agreements or standards.  Using military power is expensive for the 
intervening party as well as for the targeted groups.  Intervening countries can choose 
between military assistance or military intervention.  In the late 1970s, the US, for 




withdrew their forces from Ethiopia (Rothchild, 1997, pp. 105-106).  Military 
intervention was used recently to help defeating Gadhafi’s regime in Libya. 
The Phases of Conflicts 
Rothchild (2003) argues that the instruments to manage or end conflict are not always 
effective.  The article identifies phases of conflict and the respective optimal tools.  The 
author states, though, that the phases are overlapping.  Identifying the conflict phase in 
which a given conflict is, can be difficult.  Often it only is possible retrospectively.  This 
creates a dilemma for the intervening party.  Intervention in early phases of conflict is 
cheaper and can possibly prevent violence.  In later phases, more resources have to be 
diverted to intervention in order to have an impact on the conflict.   
Conflict is a dynamic process with five phases.  The conflict will naturally go through all 
five phases.  Interventions, however, can reverse or slow down the process (Rothchild, 
2003).  Rothchild (2003) agrees with Rubin and Campbell (1998) that conflicts do not 
experience all phases in one rush.  Instead, conflicts alternate between violence and 
armed peace.  As noted by Fearon (1995), most civil wars observed during 1990 and 
2000 started shortly after World War II.  Every conflict needs to be evaluated 
individually, the five phases shall serve as a mind map to find the right mix of methods of 
intervention for every conflict.  Figure 1 illustrates the phases of conflict and the 






The phase of potential conflict ( )a  (see Figure 1) deals with the underlying root causes 
and dynamic pressures.  Intervention is cheap and bears great potential for relief.  
Intervening parties can directly influence any socio-economic, cultural, or institutional 
issues.  Rothchild (2003) argues that all issues are negotiable, no matter if they are 
tangible or intangible, true or imagined.  However, without very detailed knowledge 
about a society, this phase is very hard to spot in time.  The most effective instruments of 
intervention are diplomatic mediation and economic incentives.  Force or sanctions 
would exacerbate grievances and speed up the process towards violence. 
The phase of gestation ( )b  is more difficult to influence because the opposing groups are 
already at the brink of violence.  The intervening party has to demonstrate dedication and 
Figure 1:  The Phases of Conflict and Respective 




willpower to prevent conflict.  Diplomatic mediation and economic incentives have to be 
reinforced with threats, sanctions, and insurance. 
The trigger ( )c  is rather an event than a phase.  It is hard to predict and can result in 
immediate violence.  In Rwanda, for example, violence broke out immediately after the 
crash of the airplane that was carrying the Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana and 
the Burundian president Cyprien Ntaryamira.   
The escalation phase ( )d  is the hardest and most expensive time of intervention.  In 
addition, the expected impact of intervention is at its minimum in this phase.  Military 
intervention needs to stop the violence, sanctions need to cripple the supply of military 
goods, purchases and economic support need to satisfy even hardliners, and insurances 
need to guarantee lasting peace.   
During the post-conflict phase ( )e  the marginal utility of intervention rises again.  
Military intervention in the form of peacekeeping forces is recommended.  Since the 
boots are already on the ground, intervening parties can more easily enforce insurances 
and sanctions.  The sanctions should be removed as the peace process advances. 
Conflicts can be separated into five different phases: potential conflict, gestation, trigger 
event, escalation, and post-conflict phase.  The early phases are difficult to reveal, but 
they reveal the highest payoff rates of intervention.  The further the conflict progresses, 
the lower the marginal utility of intervention, and the more coercive incentives are 




Diplomatic mediation should be used in every phase.  Intervening parties face a dilemma 
concerning the timing of military intervention.  It would be beneficial to deploy military 
forces prior to the trigger event for the purpose of preventing suffering during the early 
escalation phase.  However, the trigger event often is not predictable.  Military 
deployment would then have to start in the gestation phase.  However, in this case, the 
intervening party would militarize the conflict even before the potential belligerents 
would. 
Trust-Building Measures 
The same set of phases and methods of intervention apply for identity-based conflicts and 
divided societies.  Lake and Rothchild (1996) discuss intervention in ethnic conflicts and 
conclude that ethnic conflict is caused by insecurity and mistrust.  Therefore, prior to the 
“regular” methods of intervention, local authorities or external parties have to use 
confidence-building measures in order to build trust between the groups and allow for 
peace.  Because ethnicity is exclusive, interactions may become rare.  This leads to low 
trust levels that have to be increased before further cooperation is possible.  Lake and 
Rothchild (1996) identify trust as the primary goal for intervention in ethnic conflict.  
They list four confidence-building measures. 
Lake and Rothchild (1996, pp. 57-58) argue that hostilities in Bosnia worsened because 
the Serbs described the Muslims as second-class citizens.  Therefore, the first confidence-
building measure is demonstrations of respect.  State elites and dominant groups have to 




The second measure of trust-building is power-sharing.  Nelson Mandela included power-
sharing in South Africa’s interim constitution to appease the local as well as the external 
white community.  However, the authors also argue that power-sharing agreements may 
fail and even renew conflict if they are poorly enacted.  The society first needs to develop 
an ethical standard of collaborative politics (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, pp. 58-59). 
Third, elections can provide stability by giving groups the incentive to organize, discuss, 
and form coalitions.  Electoral rules have to guarantee minimal representation and require 
candidates to represent more than one ethnic group.  Furthermore, elections have to be 
tied to regional autonomy or federalism.  Otherwise, it is still very possible that 
minorities will be excluded from the democratic process, or that political leaders attempt 
to outbid their opponents by making promises to their own ethnicity.  The South African 
National Congress, for example, adopted proportional representation in order to provide 
minorities with some security.  In Nigeria, the decision between two presidential 
candidates was made in respect of their total votes and their vote shares throughout the 
states.  They needed simple total majority as well as at least one quarter of the votes in 
two-thirds of the states (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, pp. 59-61).   
The fourth measure of trust-building is regional autonomy and federalism.  
Decentralization and local authority provides sizeable incentives for insurgents to accept 
proposals for settlement.  It was an important factor in peace talks in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, 
Cyprus, and others.  Ethiopia adopted a federalized system to counteract the memories of 
repression by previous governments.  However, federalized systems can also lead to 




cases of Yugoslavia and Sudan demonstrated that revoking federalized systems can be a 
reasons major renewed violence (Lake & Rothchild, 1996, pp. 61-63). 
The Pressure and Release Model 
The Pressure and Release model (PAR model) originates from the disaster research field.  
It describes how the progression of social vulnerability increases the risk of a disaster.  
The PAR model facilitates the identification of vulnerable groups.  Ben Wisner, Piers 
Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis developed the PAR model by pooling their 
knowledge about social vulnerability, environmental problems, disasters, and disaster 
response and recovery.  They published the first edition of their book At Risk in 1994.  
The following discussion about the PAR model will draw from the latest edition of their 
book (Cheung, 2007, pp. 49-86). 
The PAR model assumes two opposing forces that exert pressure on a society: 
Vulnerability and Hazard.  A hazard can be anything from earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions, and floods to landslides, droughts, famines, and epidemics.  The necessary 
condition for a disaster to emerge is that the hazard occupies the same time and space 
element as human beings.  The sufficient condition is that the hazard causes substantial 
damage to a significant amount of persons making recovery unlikely without external 
help.
6
  Recovery encompasses physical as well as psychological recovery of the people 
affected.  Vulnerability refers to socially constructed factors that exacerbate potential 
damage from a hazard (Cheung, 2007, pp. 49-50). 
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The PAR model breaks down vulnerability into root causes, dynamic pressures, and 
unsafe conditions (see Figure 2).  This distinction helps to identify progressions of 
vulnerability and to trace symptoms back to their causes.  Furthermore, the corresponding 
time elements provide information about whether changes can yield immediate relief.  
Issues that are deeply rooted in the political or economic system may not be able to 
change instantly.  
Root causes are the underlying processes that characterize the interactions within a 
society and its relations to the global community.  Root causes are generally entrenched 
in cultural traditions, ideologies, and beliefs.  Hence, they are usually very distant in time.  
Spatial distance arises either from physical distance or from non-participatory or 







Dynamic pressures are immediate appearances that channel the root causes into unsafe 
conditions (Cheung, 2007, pp. 53-54).  The PAR model mostly deals with internal 
dynamics such as demographic change, urbanization, public debt, natural resource 
degradation, and the failures of markets and institutions.  Given a growing global 
interdependence, country studies need to consider external influences as well.  External 
dynamic pressures are volatile world prices, foreign direct investments, spillovers from 
external conflicts, refugees, or environmental change. 
The physical environment, poor economic performance, a lack of social networks, and 
bad governance create risky livelihoods.  Unsafe conditions are very tangible and allow 
Figure 2: The PAR model (adapted from Cheung (2007, p. 51)) 
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micro-mapping in order to identify groups that need increased attention before and after a 
disaster (Cheung, 2007, pp. 54-55). 
The PAR model states that the risk of a hazard causing a disaster is exacerbated by 
vulnerability.  Therefore, the risk of a disaster ( R ) is a function of vulnerability (V ) and 
the intensity of the hazard ( H ) (Cheung, 2007, p. 49). 
 ( , ) *R f V H with R V H   
This form is very appropriate since it shows that a disaster cannot occur if either 
vulnerability or hazard are non-existent.  In addition, even a minor hazard can cause a 
major disaster if the vulnerability is sufficiently large.  The PAR model suggests different 
outcomes for the exact same hazard in different societies. 
The model incorporates pressure releasing effects as positive developments that reduce 
vulnerability.  Appropriate government policies may counteract dynamic pressures or 
unsafe conditions.  Temporary solutions can have immediate effects.  However, policy 
makers have to understand that they cannot achieve sustainable improvements without 








The Methodology presents the theoretical frameworks with which the research problem 
will be approached.  The literature presented is part of the field of conflict economics.  
The models presented show how economic incentives influence the decision making of 
conflicting parties.  Though every model studies peace and conflict from a different 
angle, they are based on similar assumptions and draw from the correlates of peace and 
war presented in the Literature Review. 
The structure of this chapter follows a logical as well as chronological pattern.  The first 
part introduces terminology and assumptions related to game-theoretic modeling of 
conflict.  Understanding different types of games, the role of information, and the number 
of players eases the understanding of assumptions made in the frameworks below.  
Economic models have to be studied in context with the knowledge, and political and 
economic situation in which they were formed.  No model fits every situation; different 
situations require different assumptions.  Often, assumptions move the model away from 
reality.  On the other hand, assumptions facilitate modeling and yield the opportunity to 




What cannot work in a rather unrealistic but rational setting, will not happen in reality.  
Therefore, early economic modeling of conflicts assumes situations of perfect and 
complete information.  This way, Haavelmo (1954) could show that it is rational for 
individuals to engage in conflict.  Hirshleifer (1989) then introduced contest success 
functions to show when it is rational to engage in conflict.  Recently, scholars have begun 
to expand these models in order to incorporate military and strategic advantages, 
asymmetric information, misperceptions, group dynamics, emotions, etc.  Furthermore, 
they tailored models to specific situations and viewpoints.  Grossman (1991), for 
example, studied insurrections and separated the incumbents’ and insurgents’ views. 
Accordingly, the second part of the Methodology presents the framework of production 
versus appropriation by Haavelmo (1954).  Following the same reasoning, Tullock 
(1974) discusses the social welfare costs of appropriation.  This model suggests that 
ending a conflict by installing a power monopoly is not necessarily the best solution.  
Afterwards, Hirshleifer’s approach introduces malevolence as well as benevolence, 
disharmonious consumption, and misperceptions.  Hirshleifer’s graphical approach also 
introduces areas of potential settlements and minimum requirements for sustainable 
settlements.  The following models study threats, the order of movement, information, 
payoff schemes that motivate to join a revolution, peaceful equilibriums under anarchy, 
and territory. 
Game Theoretic Choices in Modeling Conflict 
In terms of Game Theory, the interaction of conflicting parties is characterized by plays, 




move.  Each round requires the players to bargain, negotiate, and decide on their resource 
allocation.  The path chosen is called a move.  The end of the play generates a payoff.  A 
dichotomous model has only one play and ends with peace or war and the respective 
payoffs for the players.  A continuous model allows for sequential plays.  A termination 
rule determines the end of the play, or the last round.  A termination rule can include the 
declaration of war or a date, e.g. an ultimatum (Hirshleifer, 1995b, pp. 168-169). 
Dichotomous models of conflict allow conflict to end with either peace or war.  This type 
of analysis yields a yes or no answer on peace and war and helps to determine the 
correlates of conflict and the chances of victory.  Researchers may use dichotomous 
models to study a certain situation on a small time scale.  However, dichotomous models 
do not allow for continuous research.  After the players decide on peace or war, the 
model assumes the conflict to be over.  Continuous models, on the other hand, assume 
players to alternate between peace and war over long periods
7
.  Both outcomes to the 
bargaining model are coexistent.  Repeated interactions of the conflicting parties yield an 
equilibrium between peace and war.  Continuous models inform about the intensity of 
conflict and the expected distribution of the resources in the dispute (Hirshleifer, 1995b, 
p. 168). 
Information 
Game Theory is about using the information at hand in order to maximize profits and 
minimize losses.  Each player chooses a response that fits best the other player’s decision.  
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Dominant strategies incorporate decisions that are always the best response to the other 
player’s choice.  Weak strategies are the opposite.   
Full or perfect information, generally is the preferred state because the game yields 
rational decisions.  While imperfect and incomplete information yield inferior solutions 
to the game.  In games with imperfect information, the players do not know what 
decisions were made in the past which can lead to misperceptions about capabilities, 
outcomes, and payoff functions.  
Information symmetry or asymmetry determines whether the players move 
simultaneously or sequentially.  When moving sequentially, the last-mover has an 
informational advantage since it can consider the first-mover’s choice and select the best 
response.  However, the first-mover’s choice may also constrain the last-mover’s 
selection.  In simultaneous games, the players do not know or chose to ignore each 
other’s choices (Hirshleifer, 1995b, pp. 168-169).   
First- and Last-mover advantages depend on the set up of the game.  Efforts to increase 
the possibility ( ip ) to win a price ( P ) differ between simultaneous moves and sequential 
moves games.  The favorite has an incentive to over-commit resources and the underdog 
to spend less than in a sequential mover game.  Being the favorite means to have a chance 
of victory higher than 50%: 1/ 2ip   (Baik & Shogren, 1992; Baye & Shin, 1999; Dixit, 
1987, 1999).   
Generally, game theoretic models assume that (a) the players know all potential 




players have all information.  Hence, all players are supposed to evaluate a situation 
equally and act according to their best-response functions. 
Commitment Problems 
Per definition, competition is Pareto-superior to conflict.  In conflict, at least one party is 
engaging in unproductive actions.  Therefore, peaceful settlements are the preferred 
outcome to conflict.  However, the prospect of an agreement is necessary but not 
sufficient.  Settlements require enforcement and often a third party needs to overcome the 
commitment problem (Hirshleifer, 1995b, p. 169).   
Telser (1980) writes about the last-round problem:  If the players know that a game has a 
finite amount of rounds and they know when the last round is, they will not obey to any 
agreement when violation yields higher profits.  Violating an agreement in the last round 
has no implication on future rounds.  Players can violate an agreement without fear 
repercussions. 
The last-round problem suggests that infinite rounds of bargaining would encourage 
cooperation.  However, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996a) suggest that resources which 
can be conquered now lead to increased payoffs in future rounds.  Therefore, with 
increasing expectations about economic growth in the future, conflict becomes more 
attractive in the current round. 
Alternating the number of opponents 
Microeconomic theory tries to model the real world in the simplest way.  Any distorting 




singled out.  Generally, the models start with a bilateral monopoly:  one firm and one 
household deciding on supply and demand of products and labor force, two households 
specializing on the production of goods in order to trade, or two firms choosing prices or 
quantities in response to each other’s choice.  The models can then be advanced to more 
players:  monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, etc.  Perfect competition is the last stage and 
incorporates many buyers and sellers.  Each stage yields more restrains to the players’ 
decisions and may allow new strategies such as cartels or unions.   
Since conflict economics is based on traditional economic theory, the appropriate 
economic model depends on the given situation.  The bilateral monopoly is appropriate 
for one-on-one warfare; tyrant-versus-population corresponds to the regular monopoly.  
Analogous to the original models, the two opponents in a bilateral monopoly influence 
each other’s decisions.  However, in the monopoly model, the tyrant influences the 
population, not vice versa.  The population is not a price-taker because there is no 
exchange in pure conflict models (Hirshleifer, 1995b, p. 170). 
The Technology of Conflict 
The technology of conflict comprises models on the decisions and interactions in conflict.  
Each player has a set of options, e.g. production and appropriation, which yield payoffs.  
The amount of payoffs is determined by factors that influence the options’ quality and 
efficiency.  The models below introduce parameters and indexes to scale the decisiveness 
of fighting efforts, disparities in resources and investments, and vulnerabilities 
(Hirshleifer, 1991b).  Investments in a set of options define the interactions of conflicting 




individual situations may differ, Hirshleifer (2000) introduces the term Macrotechnology 
of Conflict.  Using the models’ findings and intervening in conflict requires individually 
engineered packages. 
In order to facilitate the understanding of the models below, the author tried to maintain 
the meaning of the parameters throughout the chapter.  As a result, the parameters in the 
models below may vary from the way other scholars presented these models. 
Production versus Appropriation 
The idea of appropriation as economic activity goes back to Pareto (1909, p. 466).  Pareto 
states that individuals can chose between investing their resources in the production or 
the appropriation of goods.  Wars as well as revolutions can result in a redistribution of 
resources from the weak to the stronger.  Such redistribution will not result in the 
society’s potential maximum economic output.  National wealth is maximized by 
exchange when every member of a society produces what he or she can produce with 
relative advantage.
8
  However, Pareto acknowledges that appropriation may be a result of 
natural selection leading to a better use of the resources in the future. 
Haavelmo (1954, pp. 91-98) builds on this idea by introducing an allotment function 
which models total economic output ( I  for income) as a function of productive and 
unproductive activities.  Productive activities ( P  for producing) include all efforts that 
aim at producing a good.  Unproductive efforts ( F  for fighting) aim at impeding the 
productive activities of others and appropriating their goods.  
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 Adam A. Smith (1776) develops and discusses this idea in great detail in his magnum opus commonly 




 ( , )I P F  (0.1) 
Player i ’s income iI  is a function of its productive and unproductive efforts. 
 , 1,2,...,i i iI P F withi M    (0.2) 
Global income, or the maximum price to win from fighting P , is a function of each 
players’ productive efforts.  Unproductive efforts do not create more output.  Fighting 
only results in redistribution. 
 1 2( , ,..., )MP P P P  (0.3) 
Player i ’s income from fighting 
iFI  is a function of the total available income P  and all 
players’ fighting efforts.  In other words, player i ’s share of the price P is ip . 
 1 2( , ,..., ; )iF i MI p F F F P  (0.4) 









The model suggests a positive relation between fighting efforts and the share of the price:  
















































  is the minimum fighting effort for player i  to defend its 
assets.  If the actual fighting effort iF  exceeds the minimum requirement, player i  will 









 accounts for decreased shares when the number of 
players increases. 
Haavelmo (1954) concludes that players can generate income by appropriating from 
others.  All players have to invest in fighting efforts in order to defend themselves against 
other players.  Players will invest in fighting efforts as long as the marginal utility is 
better than the one from productive efforts.  Generally, investing resources in fighting 
efforts decreases the global income.  The more players are involved in a contest, the 
lower is the share that can be won by fighting.  The marginal utility of fighting decreases.  
In addition, the more players, the higher are default fighting efforts to defend one’s 
resources.  Therefore, as the number of players increases, players can win less from 
appropriating but they still have to invest more in fighting efforts in order keep what they 




Social Welfare Costs of Appropriation 
Haavelmo (1954) already suggests that conflict lowers the social welfare, or in his terms 
global income.  Tullock (1974) chooses a game theoretical approach to further investigate 
this problem. 
Conflict is always pareto-inefficient even when conflict is resolved by institutions, e.g. 
governments, bargaining reduces social welfare.  A government’s decision is influenced 
by lobbying.  That means, stakeholders have invested resources in order to lobby.  These 
resources cannot be used to invest in productive efforts (Tullock, 1974, p. 7). 
It is rational for every individual to invest in defensive efforts in order to secure their 
produced or appropriated goods.  If no player was to invest in appropriation, everyone 
would be better off since all the economy’s resources could be invested in productive 
efforts.  However, if no one defends his or her goods, the return in investment of 
appropriating is very high.  The players are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma (Tullock, 
1974, p. 11).  
Opposing violence only works in a state where the government and its representatives do 
not refrain from using force to protect everyone (Tullock, 1974, p. 12).  In the absence of 
a government, production without defense will result in slavery.  All produced goods are 
appropriated by thieves; recall Machiavelli’s Theorem.  
The optimal way of defending property is using a mixture of threats, violence, and 
agreements.  Threats only become credible when the individual’s capabilities and 
willingness to use violence are known.  Without the prior violence, the party being 




Agreements on transfers from the defender to the attacker prior to the outbreak of 
violence may avoid the negative effects of fighting.  However, both attacker and defender 
need a public history of violence to render their threats credible.  Furthermore, the 
defender sometimes needs to fight, otherwise it will face more and more attackers who 
seek agreements and transfers without actual fighting (Tullock, 1974, pp. 12-13). 
Figure 3 shows a payoff matrix of a two-party game in which the players have to decide 
on whether to steal or not to steal from each other.  The left part of Figure 3 shows the 
payoffs without police forces.  If both parties chose not to steal and invest all resources in 
production, their payoffs are 10 each.  If one party decides not to defend its produced 
goods, it is rational for the other one to steal.  The payoffs are 2 and 18 respectively.  
Therefore, stealing is the dominant strategy in a society without police.  The players will 
end up in the bottom right hand corner with payoffs of 4 (Tullock, 1974, p. 16). 
 
 Don’t steal Steal   Don’t steal Steal 
Don’t steal 10 / 10 2 / 18  Don’t steal 8 / 8 7 / 4 
Steal 18 / 2 4 / 4  Steal 4 / 7 4 / 4 
No Police  Police 
Figure 3:  Payoff matrix of a two-party appropriation game with and without police 
forces (adopted from Tullock (1974, p. 15)) 
 
When the players decide to establish a police force, their production will be taxed to 




to 8.  Now, if one party decides to steal, then their payoff is reduced from 8 to 4 because 
the police retaliates on behalf of the victim.  The victim’s overall payoff is reduced to 7.  
Not stealing is the dominant strategy in a society with police forces.  The game’s solution 
is the top left-hand corner when payoffs are at 8.  By establishing a police force, the 
society moves from payoffs of 4 without police, to payoffs of 8 (Tullock, 1974, p. 16). 
Tullock (1974, pp. 18-19) terms the state with police forces to be part of a cooperative 
government and compares its gains in total payoffs to the welfare losses of an 
exploitative state.  Figure 4 illustrates the welfare costs of thievery and exploitation.  In a 
society without theft, the individual might face a production frontier like 0P  and choses 
to produce 0F  food and consume 0L  leisure.  0U  is tangent to the chosen production 
point O  and represents the achieved utility level.  A cooperative state with police forces 
tries to get as close to O  as possible.  Due to taxes which finance the police, the 
cooperative state will never achieve O .   
In anarchy, the individual faces another production curve TP  which represents the amount 
of produced food it can keep.  The model assumes that if facing thievery, the producer 
will produce less and consume more leisure.  Producing at T  will yield a total amount of 
food of TF .  Thieves will steal a portion t  and reduce the producer’s income to TF t .  
The producer will achieve a utility level of TU  with T OU U .   
An exploitative government engages in thievery itself.  The ruling elite will try to force 
the producer to produce close to E .  At E , the producer invests all of his or her time in 
the production of food and does not consume leisure.  The exploitative government will 






Figure 4:  Welfare Costs of Thievery and Exploitation (adapted from Tullock (1974, 
p. 18)). 
 
Tullock (1974, p. 20) argues that the exploitative state is stable.  In order to steal from its 
population the elite has to make significant investments in coercion.  In addition, the 
government will prevent others from stealing from its population.  Private crime or raids 
by other governments would reduce the rate of returns of stealing for the exploitative 
government.  
Both government forms, cooperative and exploitative, give the population security and 
certainty on the redistribution of wealth.  A power monopoly is not always the best 




theft.  Suggesting a police force, as in the example above, is only mutually beneficial if 
all players can agree and share power.  If a police force is a one-sided effort, there is no 
guarantee that the stronger side will not use the police to acquire even more wealth.  
Instead of a cooperative government, the state will face a rather exploitative government 
(Tullock, 1974, pp. 21-25). 
Grossman (2002) introduces a parameter   for the efficiency of predation which is 
similar to the decisiveness factor m  in the models below.  With increasing returns of 
appropriating (increasing  ), producers have to invest more into deterrence and a 
government’s advantage of defending against appropriation due to economies of scale 
grows.  Grossman (2002) finds that for large  , producers are better off with a force 
monopoly even when it tries to maximize benefits of the ruling elite. 
Preferences, Opportunities, and Perceptions 
As shown by the Review of the Literature, conflict is often studied in the light of greed, 
grievances, opportunities, and hatred.  The causes of conflict can be aggregated in utility 
functions which represent an individual’s or group’s preference over a set of goods 
(exchange theory), or over income and resource distribution (conflict theory).  Utility is a 
function of preferences, opportunities, and perceptions.  Indifference curves are used to 
illustrate levels of utility.  Every combination of goods, or income distribution between 
the opponents, that lays on an indifference curve yields the same utility.  The utility level 
increases the higher the indifference curve is located.  Indifference curves are only 
defined in the non-negative quadrant of a Cartesian coordinate system.  Negative 




Preferences, expectations, and opportunities are an established framework to analyze the 
motivation of violent conflict
9
 (Anderton & Carter, 2009, pp. 67-82; Collier & Hoeffler, 
2004; Hirshleifer, 1987, pp. 273-285; Hirshleifer & Hirshleifer, 1998, pp. 530-535; 
Singh, 2007).  The opposing parties can have benevolent, neutral, or malevolent 
preferences towards each other.  In other words, their relationship is characterized by 
either sympathy or antipathy.  The expectations about the outcome of conflict are either 
pessimistic or optimistic.  The perceptions and uncertainty about strength and pay-offs 
are crucial.  Finally, the groups’ interests can be harmonious or opposed.  This has major 
consequences on potentially mutually beneficial settlements (Hirshleifer & Hirshleifer, 
1998, pp. 530-534).  The theoretical implications of preferences, expectations, and 
opportunities will be discussed further below in the context of a bargaining model. 
Preferences 
Preferences can be benevolent, neutral, or malevolent.  If the conflicting parties are 
benevolent towards each other, they will feel an increase in their utility not only when 
they receive more income but also when their opponent receives more income.  
Malevolent preferences infer a decrease in utility if the other party gains more income.  
Neutral preferences imply that there is no correlation between the opponents’ income 
levels (Hirshleifer & Hirshleifer, 1998, pp. 530-531). 
Figure 5 shows the three kinds of preferences.  The negatively sloped indifference curve 
in Figure 5a indicates that the utility level of player B remains the same even if B loses 
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  According to my best knowledge, Hirshleifer (1985, p. 63) introduced the concepts of preferences, 




parts of its income in order for player A to have more.  The figure also shows that if A 
maintains its income and B gains more, they both advance to a higher utility level (an 
indifference curve further to the right and higher than the previous).  Figure 5b shows 
completely inelastic preferences:  A’s utility level remains the same if B’s income 
changes in any direction.  The players are neutral towards income changes of their 
opponent.  Malevolent preferences as in Figure 5c are illustrated by positively sloped 
indifference curves.  Even though A’s income remains the same ( 1Ao AI I ), A falls from 
a higher utility level ( 0AU ) to a lower utility level ( 1AU ) when B’s income raises. 
 
 
As will be discussed below, the shapes of the indifference curves have a significant 
impact on the potential for settlements of conflict.  Preferences, or the attitudes of the 
conflicting parties towards each other, are important parts of conflict studies.  Hatred and 
greed (malevolence) need to be accounted for in every approach to resolve conflict. 





Opportunity is the prospect of gaining from exploiting weaker opponents.  The prospects 
are relatively low when consumption is harmonious:  all parties prosper from 
cooperation.  The aggregated sum of available income is greater in cooperation than 
when one party gets all.  In contrast, disharmonious consumption implies that cooperation 
is disadvantageous.  A party maximizes its income by conquering all resources and 
stopping any cooperation (Hirshleifer, 1995b, pp. 172-173). 
The possible gains for the opponents are restricted by the region’s available resources:  
taxes, natural resources, etc.  The aggregated gains cannot exceed the aggregated 
resources.  Hence, the conflicting parties face a budget restriction.  It will be shown 
below in Figure 7 why this budget restriction is also called settlement possibility frontier 
(SPF).  Its shape depends on the harmony of consumption.   
Disharmonious consumption favors conflict.  When consumption is disharmonious as in 
Figure 6c, players A and B will decide against cooperation.  Their respective maximum 
incomes are AFI  and B FI  ( F  for fighting).  The amount of available resources is 
maximized when allocated on just one side:  ( )AF BF AC BCI I I I   . 
If the players face harmonious consumption as in Figure 6a, they will decide to cooperate 
and share the available resources.  The respective incomes of A and B are ACI  and BCI  (
C  for cooperation).  Cooperation maximizes the aggregated available resources: 




Figure 6b shows a neutral relationship.  A and B should be indifferent between conflict 
and cooperation.   
Generally, it is assumed that consumption is harmonious.  Each player gets a share of the 
socially available resources and produces goods in which it has a comparative advantage.  
Mutually beneficial trade will yield more profits than each individual could have 
achieved on its own.  Another argument for harmony is the law of diminishing marginal 
utility:  The first unit of a good yields more utility than the second or any subsequent unit.  
The rate of utility per unit decreases and eventually turns negative.  For example, whereas 
a person might be satisfied with one pound of butter, he or she will not feel the same joy 
for the tenth pound of butter.  Finally, it becomes a burden when the person has to deal 
with 100 pounds of butter. 
Nevertheless, disharmonious consumption remains an important concept.  Joint 
production and trade may not be an option where binding agreements cannot be enforced 
(Hirshleifer, 1995b, p. 175).  
 
 






Before any opponent is able to decide for peace or war, each side will evaluate its own 
position as well as motives and capacities of its opponents.  Perceptions are crucial to 
settlements of conflicts.  If a settlement fails to exceed all expectations, it will be 
profitable for at least one party to decide for war.  
All opponents will issue threats in order to deter attacks and to express their expectations 
of the income distribution after war.  Hirshleifer (1995b, p. 171) distinguishes between 
profitable and unprofitable threats.  When profitable threats are carried out, the 
threatening party’s position is improved and the opponent is weakened.  Profitable threats 
have to be plausible so the threatened party has no doubt about the potential for it to be 
carried out.  When carried out, unprofitable threats damage all parties, including the 
issuing party.  As the example of mutually assured destruction shows, both parties will be 
significantly hampered if they carry out the threat.  Nevertheless, this strategy may deter 
attacks. 
The variety of profitable threats available to each opponent defines the threat point 
(Friedman, 1986).  The threat point marks the expected income share after war.  Any 
settlement above the threat point will be Pareto-superior to fighting.  
The discussion of Figure 7 will show why malevolence, misperceptions, and imperfect 




Hirshleifer’s Bargaining Model 
Recalling the Machiavelli and Coase Theorems as well as the discussion above, we know 
that individuals will only cooperate if they can expect greater benefits than from war.  
Any settlement has to yield each party at least as much as they expect to gain by war.  
Otherwise, it is not rational for any group to comply with the agreement.
10
 
Figure 7 shows the expectations of two opposing players (A and B) about their respective 
incomes after war.  Figure 7 assumes harmonious consumption as introduced in Figure 
6a.  Player A as an income expectation of e
AI  ( e  for expectation).  Accordingly, B 
expects eBI .  In Figure 7, A and B will only settle for incomes that lay above 
e
AI  and to 
the right of e
BI .  Therefore, the area of possible settlements lays east and north-east of the 
threat point P .  This area is also referred to as the area of pareto optimal settlements 
since every settlement in this area will benefit at least one player without the other one 
falling below his minimum income in peace.  The area of pareto optimal settlements is 
rectangular because the players’ preferences (heavy dashed lines) are neutral (straight).  
For reasons of simplicity, the model assumes neutral preferences as in Figure 5b.  
Benevolent (malevolent) preferences would greatly increase (decrease) the area of pareto 
optimal settlements (Hirshleifer, 1985, p. 63). 
The opposing parties in Figure 7 are in a dilemma.  Given the players’ initial income 
expectation of 0
e
AI  and 0
e
BI , the threat point 0P  and the respective area of pareto optimal 
settlements lies to the right of the budget constrain (settlement possibility frontier).  
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Settlement in this area is not possible because the local economy cannot provide enough 




AI  and 0
e
BI  can also suggest a first-mover advantage.  Whoever strikes first 
could achieve his or her expected income distribution.  The second mover is left with the 
remaining resources (Anderton & Carter, 2009, p. 78). 
 
 
Figure 7:  High payoff expectations from war render settlement impossible 
(adopted from Anderton and Carter (2009, pp. 79-80)). 
 
Third party intervention is necessary when the conflicting parties are unable to achieve an 
agreement.  Figure 8 shows how third-party intervention can correct expectations and 




information.  Military intervention could defend the second party against the first 
attacker.  Both methods move the expectations down and the area of pareto optimal 
settlements closer to the SPF.  Finally, economic intervention could subsidize the 
remaining difference between the socially available resources and the settlement.  In 
Figure 8, third-parties need to subsidize the difference between S  and 'S  (Anderton & 
Carter, 2009, p. 79). 
 
 
Figure 8:  How third-party intervention can facilitate peaceful settlements 





Contest Success Functions 
Contest Success Functions are a common tool in the rent-seeking theory and are used to 
model lottery contests, litigation, and violent conflict (Hirshleifer, 1989, 1991b; 
Skaperdas, 1996; Tullock, 1980).  Contest Success functions (CSF) describe how 
investments in war efforts generate a good in form of success or failure.  In a continuous 
model, the CSF yields the proportions of the resources won by war.  The dichotomous 
model requires the interpretation of respective probabilities of success.  Hirshleifer 
(1989) models conflict with two forms of CSFs.  The first depends upon the ratio of 
resources each opponent devotes towards war:   
 1 21 2
1 2 1 2
m m
m m m m
F F
p and p




iP  stands for the proportion won by war, or alternatively, the probability of victory.  
Therefore, 1 2 1p p    .    ac 1 2F F  accounts for destruction of the available 
resources by war.  iF  is the investment in war.  F could be measured by army size or the 
expenditure on arms and cannot be negative:  0iF  .  M is the decisiveness coefficient or 
war effort elasticity.  It measures the responsiveness of ip  to a change in levels of 
investments in war.  
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As long as neither party invests anything in fighting efforts, they each obtain 50% of the 





Differences between investments in war determine the second form of CSFs: 
 1 2
2 1 1 2
1 1
1 exp[ ( ) 1 exp[ ( )
p and p
k F F k F F
 
   
 (0.11) 
In equation (0.11), the decisiveness coefficient is k.  
In both versions of CSFs, the decisiveness coefficient is crucial to the decision for peace 
or war.  It determines the probability of conflict and the intensity of conflict.  If 
decisiveness is high, an opponent’s share of the resources is determined by its 
investments in war.  Low decisiveness favors peace because investments in war efforts do 
not have a major impact on the resource distribution (Hirshleifer, 1995b, p. 178). 
Both forms of the CSF are plausible.  The first, or ratio form, is applicable in war under 
perfect conditions: a homogenous battlefield, full and symmetric information, and 
inexistent fatigue.  A party that does not invest in war at all loses everything.  The 
second, or difference form, applies to non-ideal situations without full information and 
with save havens, heterogenic geography, inner group struggles, and exhaustion. In this 
case, even a party without any war efforts can retain a portion of the income (Hirshleifer, 
1995b, p. 178). 
Hirshleifer (1995b, p. 178) notes that low income groups have a comparative advantage 
in war.  They do not represent a prospective target.  However, for them the high income 




An Economic Model of Conflict 
Every economic model incorporates optimization processes for the decision-makers and 
ends up in a general equilibrium in which all decisions interact.  All decisions must be 
subject to budget restrictions.  Two assumptions generally hold.  First, the aggregated 
available income is determined by the productive activity of all opponents.  Second, the 
investment in war efforts determines the distribution of income (Hirshleifer, 1995b, p. 
179). 
The economic model of conflict by Hirshleifer (1991a) combines the four parts discussed 
above (Hirshleifer, 1995b, pp. 179-182).  First, every opponent has to allocate its initial 
resource endowment iR  towards productive iE  and unproductive activity iF  ( F  for 
fighting).  
 1 1 1 2 2 2E F R and E F R       (0.12) 
Second, the productive technology is modeled with an Aggregate Production Function 
which yields the total aggregated income I  as a function of the combined productive 
efforts of all parties (equation (0.13)).  For the sake of simplicity, using a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function is preferred.  Constant elasticities 
imply constant returns to scale:  Total aggregated income I  always responds the same 
way to a change in the players production efforts.  The reasoning for varying elasticities 
of substitution is based on increasing benefits from trade and interdependency.  As 
economies increase cooperation, s  increases and I  increase more for every unit of 






s s sI A E E     (0.13) 
Parameter A  models technological progress.  As technology advances, more income can 
be generated with the same amount of productive efforts.  
Third, the technology of conflict is modeled by a CSF.  The ratio form (see equation (0.9)
) is easier to use and excludes distorting factors such as imperfect information, 
exhaustion, etc.  
Fourth, the income distribution depends on the investments in war efforts. 
 1 1 2 2I p I and I p I     (0.14) 
In equilibrium, each party’s decision is the best response to the others’ choices.  
Considering equations (0.12) through (0.14), the maximization problems in a two-
contestant model are as follows: 
 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1( , )* ( , ) . .MaxI p F F I E E s t E F R      (0.15) 
 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2( , )* ( , ) . .MaxI p F F I E E s t E F R      (0.16) 
Setting the first order conditions to zero in order to maximize iI  and assuming i iF R , 
equations (0.15) and (0.16) can be written as reaction curves.  
 1 1 2 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
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m m m m m m
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   (0.17) 
Using the ratio form for the CSF leads to technological process $A$ being cancelled out.  
Hence, increasing productivity does not change the ratios of productive and unproductive 





In the symmetrical case, both opponents receive equal initial resource endowments and 
end up with equal shares of the total available income (Hirshleifer, 1995b, pp. 181-182).  
In his Paradox of Power, Hirshleifer (1991a) states that even uneven distributions of 
initial income can lead to equal or more even shares of the aggregated income.  
Hirshleifer distinguishes between a strong and a weak version of his paradox of power.  
Opponent 1 has the largest initial income in both cases: 1 2R R .  
The strong form of the paradox of power states that the opponents end up with equal 





 has no influence on this outcome. 
The weak form states that the final outcome will reduce initial inequalities of income 






  . 
With more resources, opponent 1 will allocate more towards both productive and 
unproductive efforts.  The investment in war will be bigger than in symmetry.  Opponent 
2 faces two incentives that increase its war efforts.  First, 2F  has to increase in order to 
match 1F  and provide appropriate defense.  Second, with 1 2E E , the prospects of 
gains through war are increased.  Therefore, conflict is relatively more profitable for the 
underprivileged party (recall that 1A s m   ). 
Hirshleifer shows that the strong form of the paradox of power only holds when the 




activities become more profitable.  With more resources, opponent 1 will invest relatively 
more in production and less in fighting.  1p  increases slowly while the ratio of fighting 
efforts to initial resource endowment 1 1/F R  decreases (compare Figure 9).  Opponent 1’s 
success fraction increases not as fast as its initial resource endowment: 
 1 11
2 2
0 1, 1 1
R R
p with A m s and
R R
           (0.18) 
Even though party 1 has a better starting position, the investment incentives of 
complementary production and higher productivity lead to more equal income 
distribution after conflict.  This situation changes when war becomes more decisive.  
With m  increasing, opponent 1 can use its advantageous initial resource endowment to 
invest more in war efforts and appropriate parts of opponent 2’s resources.  For m  that 
are not significantly greater than 1, opponent 2 will still end up with more income than it 
had in the beginning: 2 2I R .  For 1m  , appropriation becomes so lucrative for the 







Figure 9: Fighting Efforts and Relative Success as Resource Ratios vary  
(s=1.25, m=1, adopted from Hirshleifer (1995b, p. 183)) 
 
Figure 10: Income Ratio vs. Resource Ratio, as Decisiveness Parameter Varies 
(s=1.25, adopted from (1995b, p. 184)) 
 
A Model of Threats 
The model above allowed the opponents to influence the final distribution of the social 




Hirshleifer (1995b, pp. 184-187) expands the CSF from equation (0.14) by adding a term 
which entails the cost of fighting ( )ic F  or maintenance of military investments ( )ic F .  
Depending on whether the opponents chose war or peace, the CSF alternates between two 
forms: 
 ( ) ,i i iI pV c F for war and     (0.19) 
 ( )i i iI pV c F for peace     (0.20) 
For simplicity, the aggregated social income shall be fixed at V.  The individual shares of 
iI  depend, as before, on the proportion won by war or the probability of victory ip .  
However, the payoff is now reduced by the costs of war ( )ic F  if at least one opponent 
choses to fight.  If both opponents chose peace, the individual shares are reduced by the 
maintenance costs of their military investments ( )ic F .  Intuitively, ceteris paribus 
maintenance is less costly than full engagement: ( ) ( )i ic F c F  .  Peace is relatively more 
attractive than military conflict. 
 ( ) ( )i ic F c F   (0.21) 
In a two-stage model, the opponents will first simultaneously commit to a level of 
investment in fighting.  Assuming full information, the first stage reveals fighting efforts, 
maintenance costs, and success fractions i ip I .  In the second stage, the players decide 
whether to attack or maintain peace.  This ends the play and generates payoffs 
(Hirshleifer, 1995b, p. 185). 
Figure 11 is adopted from Hirshleifer (1995b, pp. 185-186) who states that this model of 




2RC  do not intersect.  According to Hirshleifer, the costs of fighting can outweigh the 
benefits of war.  Hence, at a critical point, the opponents are indifferent between fighting 
and peace.  For any fighting effort *
2 2F F  opponent 1 prefers war.  When 
*
2 2F F , 
opponent 1 is indifferent between war and peace.  For any *
2 2F F , opponent 1 prefers 
peace and an own fighting effort of 1 0F  .  Hirshleifer argues that when both players 
chose their fighting efforts simultaneously, take each other’s decision into account, and 
prepare adequately for war *1,2 1,2F F  they arrive at a Nash-Cournot equilibrium
11
.  
Neither opponent can benefit from changing its strategy unless the other changes as well.  
Recall that the outcomes of this play are either peace-peace or war-war.  No rational 
player would answer fighting with peace. 
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 Nash-equilibrium: No player can benefit by changing its choice when all other players keep their 
strategy. 






Figure 11: Fighting Efforts and Reaction Curves in the model of threats (adopted 
from Hirshleifer (1995b, p. 185)) 
 
This dichotomous model assumes unitary actors, neutral preferences, harmonious 
opportunities, and full information.  In addition, it assumes that military technology does 
not grant the players offensive or defensive advantages.  With this model, Hirshleifer 
(1995b) shows that sufficient investments in fighting efforts can result in peaceful 
outcomes.  
Credible threats can deter attacks and maintain peace.  However, offensive or defensive 
advantages, optimistic perceptions, malevolent preferences, or disharmonious 
opportunities can distort these results and cause war even though the costs may outweigh 
the benefits. 
How asymmetric information can promote conflict 
The commonality in the models above is that two opposing parties are in conflict and 




and strengths are public goods.  Hence, assuming that physical conflict is more expensive 
than simply maintaining the potential to fight as illustrated by equation (0.21), rational 
risk-neutral players would divide the prize in the respective portions that they could 
acquire through war. 
Peaceful settlements are always more efficient than war.  However, the discussion of 
Hirshleifer’s models already implies that wars can occur because of misperceptions.  
Bester and Wärneryd (2006) develop a framework to study the likelihood of peaceful 
outcomes when fighting efforts are already chosen but are only publicly known.  Fighting 
efforts are private information. 
Bester and Wärneryd (2006, p. 238) find that the anticipated destruction of a fraction of 
the price due to war reduces the likelihood of war.  Very little destruction by war 
corresponds to almost certain war.  Furthermore, conflict is less likely when the 
opponents see each other as powerful (p.239).  High investments of the opposing party in 
war efforts reduces the own chance of victory and reduces the own expected share of the 
price.  Finally, the risk of outright conflict decreases with more accurate information 
about the investment in fighting efforts of the other party (p.239). 
Bester and Wärneryd (2006, p. 236) state that mediation has to yield individually rational 
solutions in order to achieve a sustainable peaceful solution.  The potential outcomes by 
war create a Pareto frontier for the bargaining process (p.237).  This reasoning is similar 
to the Pareto-optimal settlement area in Hirshleifer’s model (see above). 
Bester and Wärneryd’s model differs further from other models because the relations as 




242-244) show in a symmetric, numerical example with four types of aggression and 
relatively low destruction by war that war is unlikely for low aggression types and certain 
for high aggression types.  As long as both players increase their aggression type 
simultaneously from the lowest to the second lowest stage, war is almost certain.  
However, the chances of war are lower for the third highest aggression level.  In addition, 
chances of war decrease or remain the same when one player maintains a low level of 
aggression and the other player’s level increases.  This means that aggression has to be 
met with aggression in order to escalate a cold war into a hot war. 
The chance of conflict depends strongly on the anticipated destruction that comes with 
war.  War is almost certain when the destruction is marginal and the opponents have 
similar aggression levels.  Increasing destruction not only reduces the chance of war 
between opponents with different aggression levels, but when reaching a critical point, 
chances of war decline despite equal aggression levels. 
Motives When Considering To Join a Revolution 
Tullock (1971) states that individuals who are to decide whether to join a revolution, its 
suppressors, or stay neutral must consider the existing reward and punishment systems.  
They do not base their decision on expectations about a public good:  the success or 
failure of the revolution and the resulting government style and reforms. 
The end of the revolution generates payoffs.  Success could yield, for example, a new, 
more efficient government which benefits everyone in the society.  Hence, the benefits of 




reward its participants and punish its enemies.  Similarly, the incumbent government will 
reward its supporters and punish the conspirators if the revolution fails. 
The expected payoff a neutral individual faces NP , is the likelihood of a successful 
revolution despite the individual being inactive NL  multiplied by the benefits of the 
public good generated by successful revolution SP  (Tullock, 1974, p. 36). 
 *N S NP P L  (0.22) 
This model assumes that individuals can stay neutral and do not face a “If you are not 
with me, then you are against me” mentality.  In addition, it assumes that the incumbent 
government is less efficient than the potential revolutionist government.  Neutral 
individuals will not lose anything if the revolution fails. 
A potential supporter of the revolution faces expected payoffs RP  that depend on this 
activity, public benefits, and private rewards and punishments (Tullock, 1974, p. 38). 
 *( ) ( ) [1 ( )] *R S N i i N i i N i w rP P L L R L L P L L L I E          (0.23) 
The participation of individual i  in the revolution increases the chances of its success and 
therefore the expected payoffs:  *( ) *( )S N i S NP L L P L  .  However, Tullock (1974, p. 
38) argues that individuals rarely have a major impact on insurgencies.  Hence, Tullock 
simplifies his model by assuming that the individual’s contribution is almost zero:  
*( ) *( )S N i S NP L L P L  for small iL . 
The second term from the left on the right hand side of equation (0.23) shows the 




rewards are determined by the revolution’s success rate.  Again, the individual’s 
participation increases the chances of success.   
Similarly, the occurrence of penalties to the individual iP  depend on the likelihood of 
failure of the revolution: 1 ( )N iL L  . 
rI  accounts for injuries suffered during the revolution and IL  for their likelihood.  E  is a 
residual term to capture other positive or negative factors. 
For the individual to engage in the revolution, the net payoff has to be greater than the 
payoff from inactivity:  * 0R S NP P L  .  Therefore, the individual considers only 
rewards and punishments when deciding whether it should join the revolution.  The 
benefits from a more efficient government apply in both cases because they are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous. 
Similarly, if the individual considers joining the government forces, the expected payoffs 
GP  depend on the likelihood of success of the revolution NL , the individual’s efforts to 
reduce that likelihood iL , rewards by the incumbent iD , punishments by the revolution 
R IP , injuries RI , and other factors E .  The expected payoff from joining the incumbent 
forces is (Tullock, 1974, p. 38) 
 *( ) [1 ( )] ( )] *G S N i i N i i N i w rP P L L D L L P L L L I E          (0.24) 
Again, the individual’s decision to pick a side rather than remaining neutral is guided 




This result is important since it moves the romantic picture of revolting for a better cause 
closer to reality.  Individuals join a side in order to maximize their private gains.  
Insurgency becomes a business activity.
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This conclusion becomes even more apparent when neutral individuals have to face 
punishments from both sides during the revolution.  Kalyvas (2006) found that entire 
communities switched back and forth between supporting government and rebel forces in 
the Greek civil war according to which party currently controlled the respective 
geographic region.  This way the people were able to maintain their businesses, acquire 
protection from the party in control, and to avoid punishments for supporting the “wrong” 
side.  
A Stable, Peaceful Equilibrium in Anarchy 
Hirshleifer (1995a) argues that anarchy may provide a stable system without outright 
conflict.  Anarchy is not the absence of structure (amorphy).  In amorphy, resources 
cannot be controlled and territory cannot be seized. Anarchy is a social structure in which 
the players contest over resources without effective regulation (Hirshleifer, 1995a, p. 27).  
This model differs from other models of conflict as discussed above or in Hirshleifer 
(1988, 1991a), Skaperdas (1992), and Grossman and Kim (1994) in that it allows for a 
continuous conflict.  Resources can be redistributed more than once (Hirshleifer, 1995a, 
p. 29 Footnote).  
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Hirshleifer assumes full information, no opportunity costs of fighting in form of foregone 
income from production, non-destructive fighting, no geographical factors, and no 
problems of group dynamics.  Finally, the model is limited to a steady-state analysis 
(Hirshleifer, 1996, pp. 35-36).  These assumptions facilitate modeling conflict in anarchy.  
The model could be extended to account for complex problems such as geographic 
advantages or asymmetric information. 
For a two contestant conflict in anarchy, Hirshleifer (1995a, p. 30) assumes a linear 
production unction.  The individually available resources are a function of productive and 
fighting efforts. 
 i i i i iR a E b F   (0.25) 
The socially available resources are the sum of individually available resources:  
1 2R R R  .  Hence, fighting is non-destructive.  ia  and ib  are the constant costs of 
transforming inputs into productive and fighting efforts.  
Let iY  be the income of player i , and ie  the intensity of player i ’s production efforts, 
then the production function is: 
 ( )h hi i i iY E e R   (0.26) 
with 
 / /i i i i i ie E R and f F R   (0.27) 





The success fractions ip  with 1 2 1p p   represent the probability of success of 
controlling resources through fighting.  Hence, the individually controlled resources are: 














Hirshleifer (1995a, pp. 32-34) shows that if 1m , then 1 2/ 0p p   for all 1 2f f  and 
1 2/p p   for all 1 2f f .  This means, as the decisiveness parameter m  approaches 1, 
player 1’s probability of success to control resources will be zero as long as his fighting 
intensity is smaller than player 2’s fighting intensity.  Similarly, player 1 will gain all 
resources of his fighting intensity is bigger than the one of player 2.  Therefore, if m  is 
sufficiently high, the players face a winner-takes-it-all contest.  If 1m  , both players 
will obtain control of some resources even when 1 2f f . 
The necessary conditions for stable anarchy are dynamic stability and viability.  Anarchy 
is dynamically stable with a sufficiently low decisiveness parameter m .  High m  leads to 
the breakdown of anarchy because one player may become a hegemon.  Hirshleifer 
(1995a, p. 33) argues that viability is given when the individual income is higher than a 
minimum y  that is needed for survival and group integrity:  iY y . 
Analog to previous studies, Hirshleifer (1995a, p. 35) finds that higher m  and lower ib  




fighting efforts.  Both sides are motivated to invest more in fighting efforts in order to 
minimize losses. 
Substituting equation (0.28) into (0.26), and solving the production function for a 
symmetrical case with N  contesters and equal cost coefficients 1 2 ... Na a a    and 
1 2 ... Nb b b   , one can see the influence of increasing numbers of contestants on 
fighting efforts and income (Hirshleifer, 1995a, pp. 37-39).  
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 R Nr  (0.32) 
Equation (0.30) shows that individual income will decrease when the number of players 
increases exogenously.  Equation (0.31) suggests that the income will decrease even if N  
increases endogenously by increasing the socially available resources.  Given that 
coalitions are not allowed, every player has to take every one’s else fighting efforts into 
account in order to maximize its own payoff.  Therefore, the fighting efforts have to 
increase in order to compensate for the increased number of adversaries. 
Calculations show that a decrease in player 1’s production costs increases his income but 
leaves everything else unchanged.  On the other hand, a decrease in player 1’s fighting 




Since player 2 still faces the same fighting costs, he will not respond with a 1:1 increase 
in fighting efforts (Hirshleifer, 1995a, pp. 39-40). 
Similarly, if h  raises it will not have an impact on fighting efforts.  Only the income of 
the player affected by the change will increase.  An increase of m  for player 1 will 
increase all fighting responses of that player and increase its income.  Player 2 will 
respond with higher fighting efforts but eventually reach a point when the gain by 
fighting is outweighed by the costs (Hirshleifer, 1995a, p. 40). 
Changing the analysis from a Cournot to a Stackelberg equilibrium, Hirshleifer (1995a, 
pp. 40-41) finds that fighting efforts are generally smaller and incomes are higher.  Since 
the follower can optimize his decision to the leader’s choice, the follower can have a 
relative advantage.  In accordance with Gal-Or (1985) Hirshleifer finds that the follower 
has the advantage when the reaction functions are upwards sloping and the leader has the 
advantage when the reaction functions are downward sloping. 
Territory and Borders 
Findlay (1996) develops a model of conflict in which the territory controlled by a player 
is the dependent variable.  The model finds that improvements in military technology 
increase the marginal productivity of war efforts.  Hence, the territory controlled should 
increase as well.  This result is similar to the models discussed above:  Fighting efforts 
should increase as they become less expensive or more productive. 
Findlay (1996, p. 44) further suggests that improvements in production technology have 




the opportunity costs of fighting efforts.  However, the increased productivity of land 
makes it more valuable and increases the marginal productivity of war efforts.  The 
relative marginal products of productive and war efforts will determine which effect is 
dominant. 
When allowing the victor to incorporate the population of the newly gained territory, both 
the new labor force and the increased army yield increased payoffs (Findlay, 1996, pp. 
45-46). 
The monotonically increasing 'LL  in Figure 12 illustrates the opportunity costs of 
warriors in terms of their respective marginal productivities as labor force.  A little army 
(small F ) reduces the labor force and its productivity only by small amounts.  Reducing 
the labor force further by allocating even more resources toward fighting effort has 
increasing negative effects on the productivity of the work force. 
The 'FF  curve represents the marginal benefits of the army’s size.  The concave part of 
'FF  suggests decreasing marginal utility of army size.  The reasoning for this is that an 
army needs to be maintained, cannot conquer or defend unlimited amounts of territory, 
and limits the available work force.  With the first part of 'FF  being convex, the model 
allows for the argument of economies of scale:  Given fixed costs for the organizational 
structure, the military can support an increasing amount of soldiers at reduced variable 






Figure 12: Optimal army size given its increasing marginal costs (adapted from 
Findlay (1996, p. 46)). 
 
1F  and 4F  are stable equilibriums.  To their left, the benefit of one more soldier exceeds 
the costs.  To their right, the costs are greater than the benefits.  This is not true for 2F :  
The player has an incentive to profit from higher fighting efforts.  3F  is the maximum to 
the army size.  
Given full information, the player will move to 4F .  If the player does not have full 
information about his costs and benefits, he will not move beyond 1F .  Findlay (1996, p. 
47) compares this situation to the low-level equilibrium trap:  Players are too poor to save 
and the resulting lack of investments inhibits economic growth.  Here, if the player settles 




When adding a manufacturing sector to the model that does not need as much territory 
but more labor, land becomes less valuable and the opportunity costs of warfare grow 
further.  With improvements in the productivity of the manufacturing sector, it is rational 
to decrease the army size and even give up some territory.  On the other hand, if 
manufacturing is labor intensive, the prospect of increasing the labor force by increasing 
the controlled territory may trigger an increase in fighting efforts. 
Bó and Bó (2011) suggest similar results:  Positive shocks to wages in labor-intensive 
sectors decrease the risk of war.  However, if the wages in capital-intensive sectors 








This chapter presents the findings from the review of the literature and the methodology.  
Initially, the different perspectives on civil war from the literature review are condensed 
in a Pressure and Release Model for Civil War.  The second part situates different forms 
of intervention in this model and draws conclusions about the potential and limits of 
interventions.  Finally, the suggestions and conclusions of the economic models of 
conflict presented in the Methodology are discussed.  The essence of each problem is 
summarized in a lemma.  When appropriate, examples and suggestions are provided to 
the reader. 
The Pressure and Release Model of Civil Wars 
The PAR model carries potential for the analysis of risk and intensity of civil war.  
Natural disasters happen when human environment and natural processes occupy the 
same time and space element.  The intensity of natural disasters depends on mitigation 
efforts and is increased by unsafe conditions.  A similar crunch model can be constructed 




The literature presented above suggests several pressures that push a society toward civil 
war.  A PAR model for civil war needs to incorporate all accomplishments in this field in 
order to provide a comprehensive picture.  However, a complete review of the 
controversial discussion about the causes of violent conflict is out of the reach of this 
work.  The major factors were adopted from the original PAR model by Wisner et. al. 
and Hirshleifer’s work on preferences, expectations, and opportunity.  The discussion of 
the influences of natural resources, democratization, fractualization, exports, and income 
levels on violent conflict complement this research Collier and Hoeffler (1998); (Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2000).  Lake and Rothchild (1996) introduce the importance of trust and fear. 
The root causes in the PAR model for civil war incorporate social as well as economic 
pressures and fractualization.  Social pressures are limited access to rights, emancipation, 
political power, representation, self-determination, and institutions.  On the economic 
side, pressures exist in the access to natural resources and business opportunities.  Social 
and economic pressures entail the progression of social vulnerability from the original 
PAR model and additional factors that are unique to violent conflict.  The literature on 
violent conflict generally refers to social and economic pressures as grievances  (Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2000, 2004).   
Fractualization relates to identity-based conflicts which evolve around religions, 
ideologies, ethnicities, etc.  Group dominance and political entrepreneurship channel the 
root causes into malevolent preferences such as mistrust and fear.  Fear is also created by 





In addition to group dominance and political entrepreneurship, dynamic pressures are 
demographic change, urbanization, public debt, natural resource degradation, imperfect 
and incomplete information, public goods, and local markets and credit supply.   
Unsafe conditions reflect opportunities, preferences, and perceptions that evolve from the 
previous stages.  Low opportunity costs of war will increase the risk of violent conflict to 
resolve grievances.  Furthermore, low opportunity costs will rebellion-as-investment and 
rebellion-as-business more profitable.  Misperceptions about one’s own or the 
adversary’s strength or motives can lead to conflict.  Misperceptions can also involve 
exaggerated expectations about post-conflict income distribution.  Hirshleifer (1985, pp. 
63-64) call this motivation rebellion-by-mistake.   
External pressures tighten the space in which internal dynamics can evolve and 
conflicting parties can avoid each other.  The literature suggests that international trade, 
world market prices, borders, spillovers from out-of-state conflicts, and pressures by 
foreign governments and organizations limit the chances of relief for and worsen internal 
pressures.   
Natural hazards can destroy resources and set back development.  They reduce the 
available income for peace settlements.  Moreover, natural hazards require better 
engineered solutions to improve production and they impose restrictions on what 
economic sectors are profitable to develop.  Every sector responds differently to natural 
hazards and therefore, has more or less resilience. 
It is inherent in the concept of conflict that parties with conflicting interests occupy the 




beneficial way to contest over resources and to define property rights can reduce conflict 
and relief pressure.  Civil war occurs when internal as well as external pressures find no 
other form of relief. 
 
Civil war is likely to occur if either internal or external pressures are high.  The most 
severe and intense conflict can be expected if both factors are very high.   
The risk of conflict or its intensity can be reduced by releasing pressure.  The most 
effective improvements will be achieved by tackling the root causes and influencing 
preferences, expectations, and opportunities.  However, these will also be the ones most 
difficult to change.  Third party intervention is required when the local population and 
authorities are overwhelmed with the situation. 
ROOT CAUSES 
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Intervention in the PAR model for Civil War 
As noted by Rothchild (1997), coercive measures are instruments of conflict management 
that can temporarily force a stop to conflict.  They separate the belligerents and offer a 
time window for other instruments of intervention.  Coercive measures, such as physical 
force, threats, or sanctions, do not reduce grievances and do not provide relief.  Physical 
force may change the type of warfare if the belligerents have to bypass peace-keeping 
forces.  Targeted sanctions may raise the opportunity costs of violence or lower the 
supply of arms.  General embargoes, however, might further worsen the situation for 
groups that are already in need.  Either way, they fail to address underlying root causes or 
expectations and preferences.  Coercive measures cannot result in sustainable peace. 
Noncoercive instruments have to complement coercive measures to allow for sustainable 
peace settlements.  In terms of the PAR model for civil war, mediation might lower the 
expectations and deal with misperceptions.  The effects on grievances are ambiguous.  
Noncoercive incentives might build up trust and a non-violent bargaining atmosphere.  
They might even result in an agreement to settle the dispute.  However, the high ratio of 
renewed violence after settlements shows that diplomatic intervention alone cannot 
provide enough credible incentives.  Otherwise, the parties would comply with the 
agreement either because of self-interest or fear of retaliation. 
A comprehensive approach to sustainable peace has to combine the traditional methods 
of intervention with an incentive-based approach.  Intervening third parties have to 
engage in economic development and state building.  The provision of public goods and 




and increasing income levels will also increase the opportunity costs of war.  Diplomatic 
intervention will reduce misperceptions and expectations about profits from war.  
Military intervention in ongoing violence can reduce its severity and create safe areas.  
Pre-conflict intervention may delay the outbreak of violence until the other intervention 
methods start working. 
The next section will show what role economic incentives play in civil war as well as 
why and how economic incentives increase the chances of peaceful, lasting settlements.  
Economic Incentives in Civil Wars 
This chapter discusses and interprets problems which arise from modeling the economic 
incentives in civil wars.  The findings below show what economic incentives exist in 
Civil Wars, how they influence the opponents’ decision-making processes towards peace 
or war, and how third parties can use incentives to lead a conflict into a desired direction.  
The structure of this section generally follows the logical and chronological pattern of the 
chapter on The Technology of Conflict.  Since all terms and frameworks are introduced at 
this point, few alterations are possible whenever appropriate.  Each problem is discussed 
separately and its essence is stated in a lemma. 
Players can generate income either by production or appropriation.  As suggested by 
Adam Smith and his essays on the Division of Labor, players should concentrate on 
whatever they do best.  However, the economic framework of exchange theory does not 
account for conflict.  Haavelmo (1954) fills this gap with an allotment function that 




Machiaveli Theorem even claims that no individual will pass up a chance to exploit 
others. 
 Income is a function of production and exchange, as well Lemma 1:
as thievery.  It is rational for a player to appropriate from others, 
especially when the victim does not defend itself.  
Individuals join a revolution when the immediate benefit outweighs the risks and costs of 
fighting.  Tullock (1971) argues that individuals do not only join a civil war because they 
hope to gain rights, representation, or emancipation.  Given that such rights are probably 
public goods if the civil war ends correspondingly, even individuals that did not join the 
fight can benefit.  Assuming that a common individual has no significant impact on the 
ending of a civil war, the individual does not need to join the fight even if it values rights, 
representation, or emancipation.  If however, joining the fight bears significant immediate 
rewards, the individual has motivation to pick a side.   
 If the payoff of a civil war such as rights, representation, Lemma 2:
or emancipation is a public good, individuals do not have an 
incentive to join the fight unless they are presented immediate 
rewards that outweigh the costs and risks of picking a side. 
Incentives to pick a side rather than to stay neutral can be economic or security 
incentives.  Kalyvas (2006) explains how entire communities would alternate between 
supporting either the communist insurgents or the government forces in the Greek civil 
war.  Supporting whoever currently controlled the territory would secure defense against 




Despite this, players maximize their incomes by appropriating from others, conflict is 
undesirable from a macroeconomic viewpoint.  Conflict does not produce goods, it only 
leads to redistribution.  Social welfare is higher in peace than it would be during conflict.   
 Conflict is undesirable on the social level but maximizes Lemma 3:
income on the microeconomic level.  
If property rights are not enforced, the dominant strategy of each player is to appropriate.  
Recalling Figure 3, appropriation yields the highest payoff: 18 for the thief and 2 for the 
player who is not appropriating.  Knowing this, the other player will respond by 
appropriating as well.  Compared to not appropriating, the player gains 2 more income.  
Regardless of the other player’s decision, each player achieves a higher payoff by 
appropriating.  The players are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma:  Even though 
cooperation would increase individual payoffs to (10/10), the dominant strategy of 
appropriating traps them in a payoff of (4/4).  In this example, conflict reduces social 
welfare from 10 10 20   to 4 4 8  . 
 Without enforcement of property rights, players are Lemma 4:
trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma.  Conflict is the dominant 
strategy. 
Tullock (1980)’s way of constructing Figure 3 suggests that conflict destroys resources if 
both parties decide to engage in conflict.  Social welfare is reduced from 20 to 8.  
However, if only one party were to decide in favor of conflict, social welfare would still 
be 20 18 2  .  Instead of payoffs of (18/2) and (2/18), the reader should assume payoffs 




strategy, the victim’s payoff needs to be less than its payoff from fighting back (here 4), 
and the aggressor’s payoff needs to be higher than the alternative of cooperating (here 
10). 
Enforcing property rights changes the dominant strategy and reduces conflict.  The right 
hand side of Figure 3 illustrates Tullock (1980)’s thought process.  Again, if both parties 
steal, they gain a total payoff of 4 4 8  .  However, if only one decides to steal, the 
victim has no incentive to change its decision from cooperation to appropriation.  By not 
fighting back, its payoff decreases from 8 to7, compared to a payoff of 4 by fighting 
back.  Punishment of appropriation makes conflict unattractive.  All players choose to 
cooperate.  Social welfare increases from 4 4 8   without enforcement, to 8 8 16   
with enforcement.  Since property rights enforcement needs to be financed, Tullock 
(1980) argues that some resources are still lost to conflict and the maximum of social 
welfare (payoff 10/10) cannot be reached.   
 Enforcing property rights overcomes the prisoners’ Lemma 5:
dilemma and yields higher payoffs.  However, social welfare does 
not reach its full potential. 
Definition and enforcement of property rights are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for settling conflicts.  Credibility and independence of the property rights enforcing 
power monopoly are essential.  Following the reasoning of Figure 4, individual players 
may be better off by defending themselves than by facing a selective or exploitative 
property right enforcement.  Influencing the power monopoly allows a player to become 




 If conflicting parties cannot agree on an independent Lemma 6:
power monopoly to enforce property rights, they are better off 
defending themselves. 
This is a real world problem:  Efforts of building up and supporting local security forces 
in Afghanistan and Iraq are inefficient because recruits act as spies for other groups, or 
desert after the training.  Through loyal members within the new security forces, 
conflicting parties can undermine operations, steal intelligence and resources, and plan 
more efficient attacks. 
 If credibility and independence of the power monopoly Lemma 7:
are not guaranteed, disarmament and a shared defense force are 
not the first best solutions. 
When conflicting parties cannot agree on a power monopoly to settle conflicts, each 
player has to invest in own production and fighting efforts.  Fighting efforts are used to 
appropriate, defend, control, and threaten.  During the bargaining process, the players 
will choose between peace and war.  Peace will only occur if both players chose not to 
fight.  War occurs as soon as one player decides that war is more beneficial to him or her. 
 Conflicting parties will only settle for peace if the Lemma 8:
agreement yields each player at least what they would gain 
through war. 
Figure 7 demonstrates this by introducing areas of pareto-optimal settlements.  In the 
shaded area, all settlements exceed the players’ expectations from war.  Ceteris paribus, 




Players decide on peace or war according to their maximization problem.  However, a 
decision for peace or war is never final.  Declarations of war and peace settlement 
agreements are bound to a prevailing set of circumstances.  When situations change, the 
players will renegotiate the contract.  Renegotiations are common in today’s society.  
Politicians renegotiate their contracts with the constituency after each term when they try 
to remain or get into office.  Hence, it would be unreasonable to assume that parties in 
civil wars never have to renegotiate.  The difference lays in their available methods of 
negotiating.  If the previous agreement failed to install enforceable and independent 
instruments, the parties will have to decide between peace and war once more. 
 Peace and war are equal outcomes to a continuous Lemma 9:
bargaining process.  
A player’s decision depends on its expectations about the generated payoff.  Players will 
choose whatever maximizes their own payoff.  As discussed above, models of conflict 
vary in the number of plays they allow.  Dichotomous models study specific situations.  
The current allocation of resources and power suggests the optimal decisions and 
responses for each player.  Optimal decisions which consider the other players’ decisions, 
are aggregated in reaction curves or reaction functions.  Continuous models enable the 
players to also discount their expected positions in the future and plan accordingly.  This 
can have impacts on current decision-making processes as well as on future plans:  Even 
if peace is the optimal decision now, at least one player could prefer war if he expects 




The reasoning is as follows:  A player might currently face only one opponent.  Settling 
for peace would allow both of them immediate gains which may exceed the benefits from 
war.  However, peace allows both players to arm even further for future conflicts.  Later 
conflicts might be more violent because of increased kill-capacity.  If one party had 
defeated the other one, future conflicts are very unlikely because the gap of military 
strength would be too big.  In addition, Tullock (1980) suggests that not-fighting could 
make the players seem less tough.  Outside players might now consider starting conflicts 
thinking that the others will share their resources rather than fighting back. 
 Players may decide against peace if future expectations Lemma 10:
reduce the benefits of today’s peace agreements. 
Expectations, opportunities, and preferences play a major role in settling conflict.  Figure 
5 illustrates benevolent, neutral, and malevolent preferences.  The attitude of the 
conflicting parties toward each other and the appreciation of success of the other one has 
immediate consequences on peace settlements.  When facing benevolent preferences, 
economic incentives towards one party will also make the other party feel better.  
However, malevolent preferences will attach negative impacts to economic incentives.  
Graphically, the different shapes of the indifference curves determine the size of the area 
of pareto-optimal settlements. 
 Malevolence (benevolence) discourages (encourages) Lemma 11:
third-party economic incentives, and limits (extends) the area of 




If consumption is harmonious, all players profit from producing goods.  Increased 
production of one player will benefit the other player.  Social welfare is maximized when 
both players have large shares of the resources and invest these in producing.  War is 
relatively more expensive and players tend to prefer peace.  Disharmonious consumption, 
on the other hand, implies that cooperation is disadvantageous.  The player is better off 
by claiming all resources and stopping all cooperation.  Social welfare is maximized by 
one party having all resources.  Natural resources, for example, could be such a rivalrous 
good that only allows the party in control to benefit.  Disharmonious, neutral, or 
harmonious consumption determine the slope of the settlement possibility frontier (SPF).   
 Disharmonious (harmonious) consumption decreases Lemma 12:
(increases) the socially available income, and determines whether 
the economy can finance a peace settlement. 
The SPF is like a budget restriction.  A peace settlement has to be within the area of 
pareto optimal settlements, or it is undesirable for at least one player.  In addition, the 
settlement has to lie within the boundaries of the SPF.  Otherwise, the players would 
agree on sharing more resources than are available. 
The conflict over the oil resources in southern Nigeria, for example, demonstrates the 
concept of disharmonious consumption.  The party receiving the rent from the mining 
companies is the only one to profit.  If the country were to extract and refine the oil itself, 
more opportunities would arise for all parties involved to profit.  
Suggestion 1: Reduce disharmony in consumption by creating more 




Perceptions about the own and the adversary’s position and strength determine the 
income expectations of war and the walk-away point from peace negotiations.  The 
intersection of each party’s income expectation from war determines the threat point.  
Any settlement above and to the right of the threat point marks a pareto optimal 
settlement. 
Since accurate information is not readily available, perceptions are based on threats and 
not-fully-informed judgment.  In addition, the players may be overly confident and 
expect higher income from war than they are actually able to achieve.  Therefore, 
misperceptions become a great problem when determining the threat point.  In the 
example of Figure 7, peace settlements only become possible if the threat points moves 
from 0P  to 1P . 
 Misperceptions can push the pareto optimal settlement Lemma 13:
area to the right of the SPF and therefore, outside of the budget 
restriction. 
The existence of misperceptions suggests that players do not have perfect and complete 
information.  In addition, information is not necessarily distributed symmetrically.  This 
means that players (a) do not know all potential outcomes, and (b) do not know the 
probabilities of all potential outcomes.   
Suggestion 2: Intervention has to address the quality and 
distribution of information before the players can fully understand 




The natures of preferences, opportunities, and perceptions determine the set of possible 
peace settlements.  If the players fail to form well-informed expectations and the 
economic structure cannot provide enough resources to support peace settlements, the 
players are forced into a conflict trap.  Outside assistance is needed to overcome the 
restriction of scarce resources. 
Suggestion 3: Third parties could subsidize the difference between 
the peace settlement and the economy’s budget restriction in order 
to free the opponents out of the conflict trap. 
The necessary intervention methods for sustainable peace settlements are military and 
diplomatic.  The sufficient condition for peace is economic intervention.  Economic 
incentives can subsidize the difference between the local economies resources and the 
peace settlement (Figure 8).  Military and diplomatic intervention can help to overcome 
or at least reduce information asymmetry, misperceptions, first-attacker advantages, and 
security concerns.  However, these instruments have limits and may not be able to enable 
peaceful settlements of conflicts on their own.  Diplomatic intervention, for example, 
needs to be accepted and mediators have to build trust.  They also face conflicting parties 
who have no incentive to publish their actual strength and intentions.  This could make 
them an easy target.  Military intervention on the other hand has commitment problems.  
Military intervention usually needs approval from intergovernmental organizations.  
Decision processes can be slow and biased.  Furthermore, as stated above, threats only 
become credible if the players have a history of evidence.  Even though military 
intervention in violent conflicts is not new, there are enough cases when the international 




Players can have different expectations from war.  Contest Success Functions show why 
some players prefer conflict over peace.  The marginal utility of fighting efforts, or the 
decisiveness factor m (see e.g. equation (0.9)), determines the payoff generated by the 
investment of one unit into fighting rather than production.  Figure 10 shows how the 
resource ratio of two players after war varies as the decisiveness factor increases.  At very 
high m , the winner of the conflict takes almost all of the available resources. 
 For some players, conflict generates more payoff than Lemma 14:
productive efforts. 
Suggestion 4: Conflict resolution needs to increase the relative 
benefit of productive efforts.  
Decreasing the decisiveness factor m  and increasing the marginal utility of production 
reduces the attractiveness of war relative to peace.  Possible strategies include denying or 
hindering the access to new military technologies and weapons.  Foreign aid, economic 
development, and state building increase the marginal utility of productive efforts and the 
opportunity costs of warfare.  
The case of Somalia, for example, shows that weapon embargos cannot entirely prevent 
the supply of weapons to conflicts.  However, embargos make the acquisition of weapons 
more difficult and therefore decrease m .  On the other hand, the Rwandan Genocide in 
1994 demonstrates that even relatively primitive weapons can cause significant violence. 
Higher productivity can also increase war efforts.  Findlay (1996) assumes a conflict over 
territory and distinguishes between an agricultural sector and a manufacturing sector 




productivity would free up labor force which could be used to extend the production onto 
additional territory or increase war efforts.  Territory becomes more valuable:  Any given 
amount of territory now can produce more, hence the marginal utility of conquering 
additional territory increases.  Therefore, higher productivity in territory intensive 
sectors, such as the agricultural sector, makes conflict over territory more attractive.  On 
the other hand, improvements of productivity in sectors which require few territory 
reduce war efforts.  If production becomes relatively more profitable, it may be rational 
to reduce fighting efforts and control less territory in order to free up resources for the 
manufacturing sector. 
 The economic structure of an economy matters: Lemma 15:
Improvements in productivity of territory intensive production can 
encourage warfare, whereas they can reduce conflict in non-
territory intensive sectors. 
Third parties have to identify the disputed resource of a conflict before intervening.  
Encouraging only agriculture in a conflict over territory may further fuel the fighting.  
However, an emphasize on the manufacturing sector may lead to a diversion of resources 
from fighting to production. 
Suggestion 5: The reason of conflict and the economic set up 
determine the appropriate tools of economic intervention. 
Resolving Civil Wars by splitting a country into several countries is not necessarily the 
best solution.  Following the reasoning of Figure 12, an army is necessary to control and 




payoff of productive efforts.  Each player will chose a distribution of resources between 
productive and fighting efforts where the marginal utilities are equal.  A player’s 
restrictions in resources or available territory can create a low-level equilibrium trap.  
When the ratio of resources necessary to defend the occupied territory is relatively big 
compared to the size of the territory and its productive opportunities, the player may not 
be able to generate sufficient payoff to reinvest and increase its welfare.  Alternatively, 
with more territory, military expenditure is comparably higher, but so is the payoff.   
 Trapping conflicting parties in small territories may limit Lemma 16:
their potential for growth.   
Suggestion 6: Cooperation and shared territory may increase the 
productivity.  In addition, a bigger army may correspond to higher 
security levels and a better defense against outside aggressors. 
There seems to be a critical size for a state to achieve its full potential of growth and 
prosperity.  Every country requires some sort of government and some sort of police or 
military force in order to provide security and stability.  Such investments have fixed and 
variable costs.  Buildings, technology, organization and structure, etc. are fixed costs.  
These investments are able to support a growing nation up to a certain point when they 
require expansion.  The variable costs are the costs per individual that profits from the 
system.  Variable costs start off by decreasing:  With every additional member to the 
nation, the costs per individual decrease.  Variable costs eventually increase and exceed 




growing nation.  From a long-term perspective, countries should not split up in order to 
profit from economies of scale and overcome the potential low level equilibrium trap. 
Suggestion 7: In the long run, a bigger area of influence allows 
players to profit from economies of scale. 
Luxembourg, Monaco, and former Yugoslavia are special cases.  Luxembourg and 
Monaco both produce high-value services and due to the free movement of labor and 
capital in the European Union, both countries have a catchment area that exceeds their 
borders.  The parties in former Yugoslavia, on the other hand, have profited from the 
break up.  The political system at the time was unable and unwilling to account for the 
interests of all players in the conflict.   
Though players cannot be forced to reduce their fighting efforts, they will do so when it 
is reasonable for them.  Lemma 9 and 10 suggest that players could choose war if 
expectations about the future lead them to believe that a demonstration of power will 
yield security in later plays.  Hirshleifer (1995b) shows that credible threats can deter 
attacks and yield a peaceful outcome.  While arming, both players can reach points when 
the costs of war outweigh its benefits.  In Figure 11, the fighting efforts 1F  and 2F  have 
to exceed 
*
1F  and 
*
2F  for both parties to prefer peace.  This adds a new way to achieve 
stable peace.  
 Peace can also be achieved through a standoff, or cold Lemma 17:




On a similar line of reasoning, Haavelmo (1954) noted that an increase in the number of 
players can also lead to a stable equilibrium.  When facing more opponents, players have 
to invest in more fighting efforts to deter or defend what they have.  Hence, the players 
could reach a critical level when they can defend their resources but the payoff of 
appropriating is marginal. 
 Increasing the number of opponents decreases the payoff Lemma 18:
of appropriation but traps the players in a security dilemma.  
Players have to invest even more in defense which reduces global 
income. 
Does having more players encourage cooperation while reducing the number of players 
encourage splitting off of small fanatic groups?  Lemmas 16 and 17 allow an interesting 
interpretation of lemma 18.  If players have to invest more into fighting efforts as the 
number of players increase, small groups may face a minimum of defense investments 
that they cannot finance with their initial resource endowments.  They would be forced to 
seek alliances and merge with other groups.  On the other hand, when dividing a large 
territory with many players into small independent territories that do not have to fear 
outside aggression, appropriation becomes less expensive.  It could now become 
profitable for small groups to violate agreements and start fighting on their own. 
As noted in lemmas 11 through 13, malevolence, disharmony, and misperceptions can 
push the players into a conflict trap, even though the economic costs outweigh the 
benefits of conflict.  Hirshleifer (1995b)’s model does not account for such factors which 




enforcement of property rights is not possible (recall lemma 7) and future expectations 
require defense forces (recall lemma 10), Hirshleifer (1995b)’s suggestion may point 
toward a possible solution in a comprehensive conflict resolution strategy. 
Suggestion 8: Conflict resolution needs to account for the players’ 
security needs.  Disarmament is not always the first-best solution. 
Anticipated destruction of resources, infrastructure, etc. by war and high-perceived 
strength of the opponent reduce the likelihood of war.  Bester and Wärneryd (2006, p. 
238) reinforce lemma 17:  With any side increasing its fighting efforts, the share of the 
contested resources rises, but the aggregated amount of resources that can be conquered 
decreases.  Similar to Hirshleifer (1995b), the players reach a point when fighting efforts 
are too high to engage in a hot war.  This is not the first time that the destruction by war 
is factored in by a model.  However, Bester and Wärneryd (2006, p. 238) also include 
different types of aggression in their simulation.  In their model, war ultimately depends 
on two factors:  low destructiveness and aggression.  Low destructiveness decreases the 
costs of war.  The aggression levels in this model are similar to the preferences above:  
Low aggression levels correspond to benevolent or neutral preferences.  High levels of 
aggression correspond to malevolent preferences.  The reasoning behind the findings of 
probabilities of war given the levels of aggression is also similar to the models above.  
Low levels of aggression allow for a bigger area of possible pareto-optimal settlements.  
High levels of aggression minimize this area and the chance for peace.  A mix of 
aggression levels yields more options for peaceful settlement than the last example.  
Finally, Bester and Wärneryd (2006, p. 238) assumed that information about the strength 




less likely to occur.  However, the reader has to bear in mind the implications of the 
discussion of perceptions above:  While high-perceived strength reduces war, 







Civil wars are driven by a variety of factors.  The many aspects and viewpoints in the 
review of the literature allow the construction of a pressure and release model of civil 
wars.  Even though the limits of this work do not allow for a complete review of all 
research on civil wars, the tendency in the literature allows the aggregation of the 
influences to political, economic, and identity-based root causes that are channeled into 
symptoms of civil wars.  The two opposing forces in this model are internal and external 
pressures.  They can increase the pressure or cause relief.  Continued pressures will 
inevitably cause a crunch of which conflict evolves.  The model also suggests that 
addressing only the symptoms will not eliminate the pressures for good.  Instead, it will 
delay and maybe worsen conflicts.  Sustainable solutions involve instruments which 
tackle the root causes of conflict. 
The framework presented here focused on the internal economic root causes and their 
manifestations.  This work shows the impacts of economic considerations on individuals 
and groups when joining or starting civil wars.  The models find that conflict is not only a 
fight for rights and emancipation, but a business opportunity.  Conflict generates income 




conflict might even experience higher payoffs of conflict than from production.  The 
models introduced two key reasons.  A player might prefer conflict because of limited 
productive capabilities or because of access to advanced military technology.  In both 
cases, the opportunity costs of conflict are very low.  In addition, if the payoffs of civil 
wars, e.g. rights and representation, are going to be public goods, the only reason for an 
individual to join the fight is when immediate payoffs outweigh the costs and risks 
involved in fighting.  Conflict is undesirable on the social level, but individuals maximize 
their profits by fighting and defending. 
The discussion of the findings suggests that peace and war are equal outcomes to a 
bargaining process that lacks other instruments of settling conflict.  When the 
independence of law enforcement and security forces is not guaranteed and the opposing 
parties do not have the possibility of calling in strikes, organizing new elections, or 
having independent judicial systems review the situation at dispute, opposing parties fall 
back to a bargaining process which outcomes are peace and war.  Conflicting parties will 
only settle for peace if the agreement yields each player at least what they would gain 
through war. 
Peace settlements are continuous processes.  Conflict-settling contracts have to account 
for changes and developments that are not according to expectations.  Moreover, peace 
settlements have to include arrangements and benchmarks in order to determine when 
and how renegotiations are needed.  Peace settlements are more than a one-time shot and 
require lasting commitment from the mediators.  Mediators can retreat from the process 





Preferences, opportunities, and perceptions may snag the conflicting parties in a conflict 
trap.  Peace settlements may require more resources than the local economy can offer.  
Small territories can worsen this situation and trap the parties in low-level equilibrium 
traps in which they cannot achieve their full potential for growth. 
The reasoning of the models discussed above opens up new ways to interpret the 
correlates of civil wars.  Moreover, intervening third parties have a new set of 
instruments to end and prevent civil wars.  External actions can cause immediate relief 
and some may even improve internal economic conditions that are part of the root causes 
of conflict.  Third-party economic incentives can increase the opportunity costs of war 
and overcome the restriction of scarce resources.   
This work found the following external economic triggers to be likely to prevent conflict 
and enable the opposing parties to settle without further conflict.  First, economic 
development in the form of capital as well as technologies increases the marginal payoff 
of productive efforts and increases the opportunities of war.  Investments into the 
economy have to be diversified.  Increasing the productivity of land in territory-based 
conflict is deconstructive to the peace building efforts.  Diversification of investments 
may overcome the problem of disharmonious consumption.  Second, economic incentives 
can subsidize the difference of resources necessary to settle a conflict and available 
income in the economy.  Third, impeding the access to military goods and technologies 
further increases the costs of war.  Fourth, all parties in a conflict need support.  Picking a 
side will intensify malevolence and at least one party will be better off with war.  Fifth, 
states can be too small to achieve their full potential of growth.  When possible, 




run, economies of scale are essential.  Sixth, disarmament can hamper the players’ 
capabilities to fight off future aggressors.  Opponents will only agree to and enforce 
disarmament when their security needs are credibly satisfied by other means. 
Overall, this chain of arguments shows that diplomatic and military interventions are to 
be complemented by economic intervention.  Economic incentives can help settle 
conflicts and prevent violence.  They should not be delayed until after or be excluded 
from a peace settlement.  In some cases, economic intervention is necessary to render 
peaceful settlements of conflicts possible. 
The suggestions above require a change in mindset of current intervention procedures and 
priorities.  Investing in an economy that struggles with civil war is necessary even though 
it may be a nightmare for banks and rating agencies.  In addition, it might prove difficult 
to defend in front of a donor country’s constituency.  Moreover, accepting that some 
conflicts do not allow opposing parties to install independent authorities and supporting 
several parties in one conflict, both are new concepts to the current black and white 
system of intervention.  One-sided support can fuel disharmonious consumption and 
malevolent preferences.  Forcing the opponents to adapt a certain government form may 
allow one party to become a hegemon.  Anarchy, on the other hand, can lead to a stable 
equilibrium without conflict.  In contrast to amorphy (absence of structure), anarchy is a 
social structure in which the players contest over resources without effective regulation.  
The discussion has shown that arming can lead to a stable non-violent solution when the 
costs of war, e.g. destruction, outweigh the benefits, whereas disarmament provides 




Suggestions for Future Research 
Even though there can be no doubt that economic incentives can prevent and settle 
conflicts, further research needs to study the impacts of economic incentives on the 
duration of peace settlements, the reoccurrence of renegotiations and violence, and 
substitution behavior of parties that choose between productive and fighting efforts.  In 
addition, research should focus not only on duration of peace settlements, but on the 
contracts’ quality.  Peace settlements are not redundant just because they tend to fail.  If 
peace settlements fail and the opposing parties fall back to civil war, all parties involved 
failed to (a) account for all relevant problems, (b) agree on a procedure to settle future 
conflicts, and (c) include a rule or timeframe in order to determine when situations 
change so much that renegotiations are necessary. 
When interpreting lemmas 16 through 18, the study raises the question whether large 
conflicts with many players encourage cooperation.  When the minimum investments into 
defense against many players are too high for small groups, they could be motivated to 
seek alliances.  On the other hand, when conflicts are resolved by secessions, small 
groups face less opponents and lower minimum costs for defense.  It might then become 
profitable to break up their alliances and fight for their own cause.  Future research could 
try to find empirical evidence for or against this hypothesis by searching for conflicts that 
were resolved by secessions and study whether big groups splintered into several small 
ones and former allies started fighting against each other. 
Furthermore, further analysis and case studies are necessary to determine when the tools 




probably is some sort of spiral management system that suggests that some instruments 
are better than others to provide immediate relief to the pressure.  Other incentives may 
be better suitable to facilitate long-term recovery and improve resilience.  The 
introduction of preferences and perceptions to economic modeling is a necessary step 
towards understanding the psychology of conflict.  Motivation research and Spiral 
Dynamics could help to explain why leaders’ or groups’ responses to economic 
incentives vary from the expected values generated by the economic models.  Such 
understanding will improve the approach of third parties towards civil wars and the 
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